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EDITOR’S NOTE

T

his issue marks a transition of significance. For much longer than I’ve
been editor, Professor Charlie Whitebread wrote an annual review of the
past Term of the United States Supreme Court. He died in September,
and we are left without his help in keeping up with the latest developments.
We are also left without his great friendship, which is noted in a tribute on
page 88. Because our readers and members have known Professor Whitebread
for so long, we also note at page 128 a full obituary you can find online.
I am quite pleased that Professor Chuck Weisselberg of Boalt Hall, the law
school at the University of California, Berkeley, has agreed to provide an
annual review of the Court’s criminal cases. Professor Weisselberg has a
wealth of experience in teaching criminal law and procedure, including 11
years on the faculty with Professor
Whitebread at the USC law school before
Weisselberg headed to Berkeley in 1998.
Weisselberg has crafted his review in ways
that you will find helpful. Not only has he
reviewed all of the key Supreme Court cases,
he has also reviewed what early lower-court
cases exist interpreting them. And he has previewed for us the key cases being argued in
this Term. If any of our readers have suggestions of how to make these reviews even more
useful, please let me know.
Our second article reviews the use of a new technology to monitor those
accused or convicted of drunk driving while under court supervision. The
new technology is a transdermal monitor, which can detect alcohol use from
the skin and sends a report electronically if a person being monitored is using
alcohol. Researchers Gene Flango and Fred Cheesman report that an early
study shows that these devices are quite effective in preventing recidivism
during the period of monitoring. They also recommend that combining treatment with the use of a 24-hour monitor like this has significant promise for
changing offender behavior.
Our third article considers the intersection of laws allowing the use of marijuana for medical purposes and drug laws. Law student Cameron Mustaghim
won the American Judges Association’s annual writing competition with this
article. Mustaghim specifically reviews the possible reasons that a person
might have marijuana for medical purposes in his or her possession while driving a vehicle. He concludes that courts should reconcile laws permitting
marijuana for medical purposes with other laws prohibiting drug possession
by generally presuming that a person transporting marijuana is doing so for
illicit purposes unless the drugs were purchased the same day.—Steve Leben
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President’s Column
Tam Schumann

In every issue of Court Review, some new members of the
American Judges Association are introduced to the AJA
through this column. Others turn here for an update. As the
AJA’s new president, my first column is a good time to look
both backwards at recent activities and forward at the next
year’s work.
The AJA today has more than 2,000 members, including
judges at all levels of the judiciary—-trial and appellate judges,
general-jurisdiction and limited-jurisdiction trial judges, and
judges in both the United States and Canada. In fact, we have
150 Canadian members, something that greatly enriches the
interchange at our annual educational conferences.
In recent years, the AJA has continued its stellar efforts to
improve both the judiciary and the skills of its member judges.
We take great pride in the annual educational
conferences, which offer several days of topnotch programming arranged by the AJA’s
Education Committee. I have presented and
attended judicial educational programs in many
states and forms but I have never found better
programming than we offer at the AJA’s annual
educational conference. I sincerely hope you’ll
make plans to join us in Las Vegas September 13
to 18, 2009, and give us a try.
The past two years have brought some innovative new programming initiatives to the AJA. Two years ago, the
AJA issued its first white paper: Procedural Fairness: A Key
Ingredient in Public Satisfaction. That paper was approved by
the AJA in 2007 and formed the basis for the special issue of
Court Review you recently received. The AJA’s paper was officially endorsed in July 2008 by the Conference of State Court
Administrators, which consists of the top judicial administrator
in each state. The California court system has begun a major
program on procedural fairness, which began on its own but has
benefitted from AJA’s common efforts. In addition, the authors
of the AJA white paper, Minnesota judge Kevin Burke, now AJA
secretary, and Kansas judge Steve Leben, AJA’s past president,
have presented the concepts set forth in the paper to more than
1,000 judges around the country, with additional presentations
in the works. The paper, the special issue of Court Review, and
the educational presentations have helped judges to improve the
skill set needed to make sure that those who come through our
courts feel that they have been treated fairly.

Last year, AJA introduced its Tell It to the Judge program.
Conceived by then-AJA president Eileen Olds and carried out
under the direction of a committee headed by Michigan judge
Libby Hines, judges in selected courtrooms in Arizona,
California, Kansas, Missouri, Nevada, Ohio, and Oregon surveyed everyone who came through their courtrooms during the
week of July 14. Designed as a pilot program, the one-page survey gave participating judges important feedback about the
perceptions of those who came through the court about fairness and public satisfaction. Research staff at the National
Center for State Courts helped with the project.
In the coming year, we plan to continue to expand the
breadth of our dynamic organization. First, we will prepare a
new white paper focusing on the key areas of judicial wellness
and judicial stress. The paper will address current issues in the legal field and the relevance of
stress to those issues. The paper will also offer
suggestions to our governing bodies as to the
maintaining of judicial wellness. I believe that
this topic is of particular importance in these
times of economic crisis. With people losing
their jobs and homes, and with other financial
assets in jeopardy, demands on the judiciary as a
whole are bound to increase as well. An effective
system of defining, recognizing, and handling
stress will allow judges to more effectively deal with this
increase both in our caseload and in the stress level of those
who come before us.
Second, we must encourage communication within the
court family. As a result, I am working to further improve lines
of communication between AJA and other organizations that
have common interests. This will include the National
Association for Court Management, the Conference of State
Court Administrators, and the National Court Reporters
Association. All of us can be more effective through common
efforts.
Common efforts are also the key to a successful judiciary—
and to a successful AJA. Let us know of ways we can be of
more help to you. And please give consideration to attending
the AJA’s annual educational conference in September 2009 in
Las Vegas. You will leave Vegas refreshed in your commitment
to being the best judge you can be and equipped with ideas that
can help you to achieve this goal, which is common to us all.
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Q
Q
Charles H. Whitebread
IN MEMORY

Steve Leben

On September 16, 2008, the
American Judges Association lost its
best and most loyal friend. Law professor Charles H. Whitebread died that day
of lung cancer at the age of 65.
Anyone who ever attended an AJA
annual conference knew Charlie
Whitebread. For more than 25 years
(no one I know can trace it back past
that), Charlie presented a review of the
past year’s decisions of the United States
Supreme Court at our conference—
every year, without fail, no matter where
we met or what date we chose for the
meeting. And every year, without fail,
Charlie would end his program by saying that the one thing we could be sure
of was that—if we invited him back—
he’d be at our next conference to tell us
what happened in the year to come.
If we invited him back? Of course he
knew he was our most popular speaker.
He was the most popular speaker and
teacher everywhere he went.
Charlie Whitebread’s reviews of the
Supreme Court were unlike any other.
He would open with a review of the most
tawdry gossip about the court he could
find from press reports and other sources
during the past year. Now in truth, little
gossip about the Supreme Court and its
justices would meet an objective stanBut Charlie
dard for tawdriness.
Whitebread was one of the great storytellers of our time, and he could make
just about anything seem extraordinary.
Those in the AJA who didn’t attend
an annual conference knew Charlie
Whitebread too. In addition to his conference presentations, he provided written reviews of the past year’s cases in
Court Review, and he served on the editorial board of this journal for the past
10 years. But many of us also knew him
as one of the most popular presenters in
the country’s leading bar-review lecture
program.
When a website (The Volokh
Conspiracy) posted news of Charlie’s
88 Court Review - Volume 44

death, dozens of lawyers who had taken
courses from him either in the bar
review or in law school posted fond
remembrances.
Many of them gave
anecdotes that give a glimpse at his wit.
One recalled Whitebread predicting—accurately—that a certain question

would always be on the bar exam for
one of two fact patterns and that the
answer would always be, “Murder.”
Whitebread’s explanation, “Why?
Because it’s the bar exam!” Another
quoted him: “If somebody’s dead, somebody’s guilty. Why? It’s the bar exam!”
Another: “Don’t be fooled by trick questions: ‘Is a lamp really a deadly weapon?’
It killed him, didn’t it?” These tributes
came from people who had taken his
courses from the early 1970s to the past
year. Charlie’s presentations were fun,
but he also made sure you’d remember
what you needed to know.
He lived life as fully as he lectured.
When he came for one of our programs
in Maui, though nearly 60 years old, he
went parasailing for the first time. He
proudly showed the photo of his largeframed body hanging in the air.
Charlie’s final presentation to us, at

our 2007 annual conference, was a fitting ending: he made the presentation
with a member of the Court in the audience. Our keynote presenter that year
was Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. When
we sent her the schedule and she saw
that Charlie Whitebread was going to
speak about her work for the past year,
she told us that she wanted to be there
for that. And she wanted to have a
chance to respond! Being very polite,
though, she said she’d like to do that if it
would be okay with Professor
Whitebread.
Charlie enthusiastically agreed, but
he did modify his presentation—even if
only a bit—with a justice in the audience. He made these presentations from
several legal pads, which included some
pages with press clippings taped onto
them (part of the tawdry gossip) and
others with scrawled notes or quotes
taken from a case. Charlie skipped a
couple of the gossip pages that year.
But he could afford to do that because
the year’s cases offered so much all by
themselves. The hit of the presentation
was a discussion of a free-speech case
you couldn’t have made up if you’d tried.
A high school senior had unfurled a banner across the street from his Juneau,
Alaska, school that read, “Bong Hits 4
Jesus.” The school principal, decidedly
not amused, suspended the student.
The Supreme Court upheld the restriction on the student’s speech, concluding
that the school had a legitimate interest
in restricting speech that might encourage drug use. (Justice Ginsburg joined
the dissenting opinion.)
Blandly called Morse v. Frederick on
the Court’s docket, Charlie Whitebread
just kept calling it the “Bong Hits 4
Jesus” case. You can imagine how much
fun he had telling us about that one.
Justice Ginsburg smiled and laughed
and thoroughly enjoyed his presentation. We all did.
We will miss him.

Selected Criminal Law Cases in
the Supreme Court’s 2007-2008
Term, and a Look Ahead
Charles D. Weisselberg

In District of Columbia v. Heller,1 possibly the most significant criminal decision of the October 2007 Term, the Court
held that the Second Amendment confers an individual right
to keep and bear arms. Respondent Heller, a law-enforcement
officer, sought to enjoin the District of Columbia from enforcing its restrictive gun laws. The District of Columbia essentially prohibited possession of handguns. It was a crime to
carry an unregistered firearm, and the registration of handguns
was generally prohibited. There were additional restrictions
on keeping lawfully owned firearms loaded or without a trigger lock; the law basically required lawfully owned firearms to
be immediately inoperable. Heller lost in federal district court,
but the D.C. Circuit reversed, finding that the Second
Amendment protects an individual’s right to possess firearms
and that the District’s laws violated that right.
The Supreme Court affirmed in a 5-4 opinion authored by
Justice Scalia. The majority opinion begins with an analysis of
the text and history of the Second Amendment. The amendment contains an operative clause and a prefatory clause. The
Court found that the operative clause – “the right of the people
to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed” – “guarantee[s]
the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.” The prefatory clause – “A well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State . . .” – fits with the
operative clause and does not restrict the right to possess and

carry weapons to members of an organized militia. So cast, the
amendment protects “the inherent right of self-defense” and
extends to the home, “where the need for defense of self, family,
and property is most acute.” The majority also found that its
construction of the Second Amendment was consistent with
interpretations of that provision from the period after ratification through the end of the 19th century. The justices characterized the 1939 case of United States v. Miller,2 which found no
protected right to transport a sawed-off shotgun, as turning on
the lack of a relationship between that weapon and the types of
arms that a modern militia might use, rather than on the fact
that the defendants in the case were not themselves part of any
organized militia. Finally, the Court’s opinion makes clear that
the Second Amendment does not prohibit restrictions on the
possession of firearms by felons and people who are mentally ill,
laws prohibiting carrying firearms in places such as schools and
government buildings, statutes placing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of firearms, and restrictions on
“dangerous and unusual weapons.”
The four dissenting justices disagreed with the majority’s
view of the text and history of the Second Amendment and
would hold that legislatures can regulate the civilian use of
firearms as long as they do not interfere with the preservation
of a well-regulated militia. In his dissent, Justice Breyer also
questioned how courts will determine whether a particular
firearm regulation is consistent with the amendment and
which constitutional standard courts will use.
Going forward, one might expect challenges to registration
laws that erect substantial barriers to possession of firearms as
well as challenges to laws that require weapons to be kept
unloaded or to have trigger locks or other devices that render
weapons immediately inoperable. These, of course, were the
restrictions struck down in Heller. We should also expect to see
some testing of the question of what other restrictions are reasonable post-Heller and some difficult issues about whether
particular types of weapons are unusual or usual, and thus
within the scope of the Second Amendment’s protections. In
the first three months following Heller, courts have upheld laws
prohibiting possession of firearms by felons,3 by individuals

Footnotes
1. 128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008).
2. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
3. See State v. Rosch, No. 59703-5-I, 2008 Wash. App. LEXIS 2207
(Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2008) (unpublished decision); United
States v. Brunson, No. 07-4962, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 19456 (4th
Cir. Sept. 11, 2008) (unpublished opinion); Reynolds v. Sherrod,
No. 08-cv-506-JPG, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60456 (S.D.Ill. Aug 08,

2008); United States v. Robinson, No. 07-CR-202, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 60070 (E.D. Wisc. July 23, 2008); United States v.
Singletary, No. 5:08-CR-12(HL), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61012
(M.D. Ga. Aug. 11, 2008). At least one court has rejected a claim
that such a prohibition is unconstitutional when the predicate
felony is not for a crime of violence. See United States v. Westry,
No. 08-20237, 2008 WL 4225541 (E.D. Mich. Sept .9, 2008).

T

he U.S. Supreme Court’s October 2007 Term had a substantial and notable criminal docket. There were very significant Second, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment decisions
as well as important rulings relating to basic habeas corpus
principles and federal statutes. This article provides a selected
overview of the Term with a heavy emphasis on those cases
that may have the greatest impact upon the states. The article
also suggests some questions left open by the Court’s opinions
and provides some preliminary indications of how several
decisions are being received in state and federal courts. It concludes with a preview of some cases to watch in the Court’s
current Term.
SECOND AMENDMENT
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convicted of misdemeanor crimes involving domestic violence,4
and by people subject to restraining orders.5 Courts have likewise sustained restrictions on the possession of firearms in particular locations (or outside of the home)6 and laws relating to
sawed-off shotguns or unusual weapons.7 There is also the
question, which has been raised in the briefing in at least one
case, whether the Second Amendment should be incorporated
and applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.8
FOURTH AMENDMENT

The Court issued only one Fourth Amendment opinion
during the 2007 Term; it addressed the relevance of state law
in determining the reasonableness of an arrest. The current
Term has a much more substantial search-and-seizure docket,
as noted at the end of this article.
The Respondent in Virginia v. Moore9 was arrested for driving
on a suspended license, a misdemeanor under Virginia law. A
search incident to the arrest turned up cocaine and cash, and
Moore was subsequently charged with a drug offense. He
moved to suppress the evidence, pointing out that Virginia law
does not generally permit an officer to arrest a defendant for
driving on a suspended license. The Virginia Supreme Court
ruled that the search violated the Fourth Amendment since the
officer should have cited Moore instead of arresting him. The
U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed. In an opinion by
Justice Scalia, the Court found that what is reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment is not determined by state-law restrictions on searches and seizures. If a state such as Virginia protects individual privacy more than the Fourth Amendment
requires, a defendant must look to state law for a potential remedy rather than assert that suppression is required under the
Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule. Concurring, Justice
Ginsburg emphasized that Virginia law attaches only limited
consequences to a police officer’s failure to follow the

4. See United States v. Booker, No. CR-08-19-B-W, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 61464 (D. Me. Aug. 11, 2008); United States v. White,
Crim. No. 07-361-WS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60115 (S.D. Ala.
Aug. 6, 2008).
5. See United States v. Knight, Crim. No. 07-127-P-H, 2008 WL
4097410 (D. Me. Sept. 4, 2008).
6. See People v. Lynch, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4587 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
July 16, 2008) (outside home); United States v. Dorosan, Crim.
No. 08-042, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51547 (E.D. La. July 7, 2008)
(post office); United States v. Hall, Crim. No. 2:08-6, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 29705 (S.D. W. Va., Apr. 10, 2008) (concealed
weapon outside of the home); United States v. Walters, Crim. No.
2008-31, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53455 (D.V.I. July 15, 2008)
(within 1,000 feet of a school). For an interesting post-conviction
challenge to a lengthy federal sentence (based on Heller), see
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment to Vacate Portion of Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2255, in Angelos v. United States, No. 2:07-cv-936-TC (D. Utah),
filed Sept. 15, 2008.
7. See United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 2008)
(machine gun and sawed-off shotgun); Mullenix v. Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, No. 5:07-CV-154-D,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51059 (E.D.N.C. July 2, 2008) (reproduction of World War II-era machine gun); United States v. Lewis,

Commonwealth’s summonsSeveral federal
only instruction.
courts have relied
Moore has thus far been
cited to turn aside arguon Moore to
ments that officers who
overcome Fourth
allegedly arrested suspects
Amendment
in violation of state law have
also violated the Fourth
objections when
Amendment.10 Several fedstate officers have
eral courts have relied on
Moore to overcome Fourth arrested individuals
Amendment
objections while acting outside
when state officers have
of [their]
arrested individuals while
jurisdictions.
acting outside of the officers’
respective jurisdictions.11 A
federal court of appeals extended Moore to a case where a search
warrant was issued by a state court judge who allegedly lacked
authority to authorize a search outside of his county; a split
Sixth Circuit upheld the admission of evidence from the search
in a federal prosecution, albeit in an unpublished opinion.12
SIXTH AMENDMENT

This past year, the Court handed down several right-tocounsel opinions with significant implications for trial courts.
The justices also tackled several important issues relating to
the Crawford v. Washington13 line of Confrontation Clause
cases. One of the Term’s Crawford decisions interpreted the
“forfeiture by wrongdoing” doctrine. The other Crawford case
concerned retroactivity rather than the contours of the
Confrontation Clause itself.
Right to Counsel
The most notable right-to-counsel decision of the Term was

Crim. No. 2008-21, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51652 (D.V.I. July 2,
2008) (firearm with obliterated serial number).
8. The issue has been raised in a pending case, Nordyke v. King, No.
07-15763 (9th Cir.).
9. 128 S.Ct. 1598 (2008).
10. See State v. Logan, No. 07-CA-56, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 2489
(Ohio Ct. App. June 16, 2008); United States v. Lopez, No. 0751037, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 14256 (5th Cir. July 7, 2008)
(unpublished decision).
11. See Rose v. City of Mulberry, Arkansas, 533 F.3d 678 (8th Cir.
2008); United States v. Gonzales, 535 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 2008);
United States v. Wahl, No. 1:07cr18-SPM, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
43138 (N.D. Fla. May 30, 2008); see also United States v.
Strasnick, No. 08-PO-224 JLA, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45353 (D.
Mass. June 10, 2008) (no Fourth Amendment violation in arrest
made by federal officer, where officer had probable cause but no
statutory authority to arrest); United States v. Wolf, No. CR. 0730102-01-KES, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62190 (D.S.D. Aug. 11,
2008) (no Fourth Amendment violation where tribal officers were
allegedly not properly commissioned).
12. See United States v. Franklin, No. 06-6499, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS
14080 (6th Cir. July 1, 2008) (unpublished decision).
13. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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Rothgery v. Gillespie County,
Texas,14 which spoke to the
point at which the Sixth
The
Amendment attaches.
Petitioner was arrested on a
charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm after a background check erroneously
showed a prior conviction for a
felony. Officers took Rothgery
before a magistrate, who made a
probable-cause determination and set bail. Rothgery posted
bail and was released. He had no money for counsel and made
several oral and written requests for the appointment of a
lawyer, which went unheeded. Rothgery was indicted almost
six months later and rearrested; he could not post a higher bail
amount and he was held in jail for three weeks. Counsel was
eventually appointed. The lawyer obtained Rothgery’s release
on bail and gathered paperwork showing that Rothgery in fact
had no prior felony conviction. The charges were then dismissed. Rothgery brought a federal civil rights action asserting
he would not have been rearrested and jailed for three weeks
had the county provided counsel within a reasonable period of
time following his initial arrest and appearance in court. The
district court granted summary judgment to the county, and the
Fifth Circuit affirmed. In an 8-1 decision authored by Justice
Souter, the Supreme Court reversed.
The majority opinion notes that the Court previously
pegged commencement of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel to initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings, whether by way of a formal charge, preliminary hearing,
indictment, information, or arraignment. The county argued
that the right to counsel did not attach at the initial appearance
before the magistrate, since (among other things) county prosecutors were neither present nor had yet made an affirmative
decision to prosecute. The Court rejected the county’s argument. The opinion notes that the overwhelming consensus is
that the first formal proceeding is the point of attachment. The
federal practice (including in the District of Columbia) and the
practice in 43 states is to take the first step toward appointment of counsel before, at, or shortly after the initial appearance. About seven states may delay appointment until some
significant time after the initial appearance; though the practice in those states is not entirely clear, the Court stated that
there is no justification for the minority practice of not
appointing counsel on the heels of the first appearance. Once
the right to counsel has attached, an accused is at least entitled
to the assistance of counsel during any “critical stage” of the
proceeding. In a part of the opinion that commanded five
votes, Justice Souter concluded that “counsel must be
appointed within a reasonable time after attachment to allow

for adequate representation at any critical stage before trial, as
well as at trial itself.” A concurring opinion by Justice Alito
(joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia) argues that
counsel need not be appointed at any particular time, only so
far in advance of trial or any pretrial “critical stage” as to guarantee effective assistance at trial. The matter was remanded to
determine whether the delay in appointing counsel prejudiced
Rothgery’s Sixth Amendment rights.
Rothgery is an important case on the question of when the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches. Although the
Court left significant questions open—most notably, the justices
declined to state any standard for when a delay in appointment
violates the Sixth Amendment—the decision may lead a number
of jurisdictions to review their practices. As one example, in
July 2008, the Maryland Court of Appeals decided to bypass
Maryland’s intermediate appellate court and directly review the
question (raised in a class action lawsuit) whether indigent
defendants have a right to counsel at initial bail proceedings.15
Indiana v. Edwards,16 another significant Sixth Amendment
case, concerns the interplay of mental illness and the right to
self-representation. Respondent Edwards was charged with
attempted murder and other offenses. He was committed to a
mental-health facility after being found unfit to stand trial. He
was eventually found fit and was tried almost six years after his
arrest. Just before trial, Edwards moved to represent himself.
The judge denied the motion, and he was tried with counsel.
The jury convicted Edwards of several offenses but failed to
reach a verdict on the charges of attempted murder and battery.
Before his retrial, Edwards again asked to represent himself
because, among other things, he and his lawyer disagreed on
the defense to put forward. The trial court found that Edwards
was competent to stand trial with counsel but was not competent to defend himself. Represented by counsel, Edwards was
tried and convicted. The Indiana appellate courts found that
Edwards was denied his right of self-representation under
Faretta v. California.17 The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the
Indiana Supreme Court’s judgment in a 7-2 decision authored
by Justice Breyer.
The majority opinion states that “the Constitution permits
judges to take a realistic account of the particular defendant’s
mental capacities by asking whether a defendant who seeks to
conduct his own defense at trial is mentally competent to do so.”
Further, “the Constitution permits States to insist upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial
under Dusky [v. United States18] but who still suffer from severe
mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.” The majority found room
for this holding by distinguishing the Court’s earlier decision in
Godinez v. Moran,19 which assessed competency to waive counsel
under the same standard as competency to stand trial. However,
Godinez sought to waive his right to counsel and plead guilty

14. 128 S.Ct. 2578 (2008).
15. See Richmond v. District Court, 952 A.2d 224 (Md. 2008) (granting petition for writ of certiorari on the court’s own motion).
Maryland is not one of the “minority” jurisdictions referenced in
Rothgery, but the Supreme Court decision may have influenced
this action by Maryland’s highest court. Richmond is set for

argument in January 2009
16. 128 S.Ct. 2379 (2008).
17. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
18. 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
19. 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
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whereas Edwards intended to waive counsel and proceed to trial
on his own. The Court in Edwards said that a different standard
for competency to waive counsel should apply when a defendant
intends to go to trial but declined the State’s request to promulgate a specific standard. Rather, the majority indicated that trial
judges “will often prove best able to make more fine-tuned mental capacity decisions, tailored to the individual circumstances of
a particular defendant.”
The decision drew a forceful dissent by Justice Scalia and
joined by Justice Thomas. The dissenters criticized the majority for finding that “a State’s view of fairness (or of other values)
permits it to strip the defendant” of the right to present his or
her own defense. Justice Scalia wrote that the decision to waive
counsel usually harms the defendant’s case, but the choice is
respected because it is one that belongs to the accused. The dissenters also called the majority’s holding “extraordinarily
vague,” noting that the Court did not state a specific standard
or even accept Indiana’s position that self-representation could
be denied if an accused cannot communicate coherently with a
court or a jury.
The Court’s opinion raises a number of questions. One is the
extent to which Edwards opens a crack in the Faretta doctrine. In
previous cases, the Court was fairly adamant that judges could
not deny a request for self-representation because an accused was
unskilled in presenting a case or because the defense was likely
to become a train wreck. This decision leaves room for a trial
court to deny a request to waive counsel based upon an assessment of the defendant’s ability to make reasoned choices with
respect to which defense to present or some other aspect of the
defense case, so long as such the assessment is made as part of a
competency determination. And it is unclear just how much discretion has now been left to trial judges, though that discretion
may be quite substantial in light of the lack of a specific competency standard and the majority’s suggestion of deference to trial
court determinations.20
Confrontation Clause/Retroactivity
The Court also significantly limited an exception to the
requirement of confrontation. In Giles v. California,21 the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder following a trial in
which the jury was allowed to consider the decedent’s prior
statement to a police officer. About three weeks before she was
killed, the victim reported that the defendant choked and threatened her. Her out-of-court statement was admitted because it
was deemed trustworthy, and she was of course unavailable to
testify. Giles’s conviction was affirmed by the California appellate courts. In a 6-3 ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the
decision. As the justices previously held in Crawford v.
Washington, the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause
requires that a witness who has made a previous testimonial
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witness is unavailable, prior
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two exceptions to this
the defendant's
requirement of a previous
ability to make
opportunity to confront the
reasoned choices
declarant: dying declarations
and “forfeiture by wrongdo. . . so long as the
ing,” meaning the introducassessment is made
tion of a prior statement by a
as part of a
witness who was detained or
kept away from the trial by
competency
the defendant. Giles prodetermination.
vided the Court with the
opportunity to address the
contours of the “forfeiture by wrongdoing” exception.
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, concludes
that the exception should only be applied “when the defendant
engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifying.” The majority drew support from the language of the
exception at common law, the absence of common-law cases
that admitted prior statements on a forfeiture theory where
there was no conduct designed to prevent a witness from testifying, and especially the common law’s exclusion of unconfronted inculpatory testimony by murder victims in the many
cases in which the defendant was on trial for killing the victims
but was not shown to have done so to prevent the victims from
testifying. The Court vacated and remanded so that the
California courts could consider the defendant’s intent on
remand.
Dissenting, Justice Breyer (joined by Justices Stevens and
Kennedy) argued that the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception
was (and thus still should be) much broader than held by the
majority. He also asserted that because the defendant knew that
killing the decedent would keep her from testifying, that
knowledge would be sufficient to demonstrate the intent that
law ordinarily demands. The three dissenters would establish a
fairly capacious test of intent, rather than require a specific
showing of motive or purpose.
Several courts have applied Giles in the few months since it
was decided. The Missouri Supreme Court and Tennessee
Court of Criminal Appeals have affirmed convictions, finding
that the exception applied and noting its particular relevance in
cases involving domestic violence.22 Two courts have made
clear that the standard of proof to demonstrate forfeiture is a

20. There have been only a handful of reported cases applying
Edwards in the three months since the decision issued–not
enough cases to discern any trend. However, one case to note is
United States v. Duncan, No. CR-07-23-N-EJL, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 57151 (N.D. Idaho July 29, 2008) where the court applied
the enhanced standard for competency to a defendant who
pleaded guilty but who sought to represent himself at the penalty

phase of a federal capital case. The court found that Duncan met
that standard and permitted him to waive his right to counsel.
21. 128 S.Ct. 2678 (2008).
22. See State v. McLaughlin, No. SC88181, 2008 Mo. LEXIS 153 (Mo.
Aug. 26, 2008); State v. Milan, No. W2006-02606-CCA-MR3-CD,
2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 757 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. Sept. 26,
2008).
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preponderance of the evidence.23
Danforth v. Minnesota24 is
another Crawford-related case,
but it addresses the power of
state courts to apply a new
decision retroactively on collateral review; Danforth does
not concern the substantive
reach of the Confrontation
Clause. It is significant to
underscore the greater available authority of the states (as
opposed to federal habeas
courts) to apply new rulings

retroactively.
The Petitioner in Danforth was convicted following a trial in
which the recorded statement of a six-year-old child was introduced into evidence against him. His conviction was made
final before the Supreme Court decided Crawford. Although
the Supreme Court previously determined that Crawford established a “new rule” that would not be retroactively applied in
federal habeas corpus proceedings25 under the principles of
Teague v. Lane,26 Danforth argued that the federal courts’ Teague
framework should not prevent state courts from developing
more generous rules of retroactivity. In a 7-2 opinion authored
by Justice Stevens, the Court agreed. Teague, the majority said,
addressed what constitutional violations might be remedied on
federal habeas corpus; it did not purport to define the scope of
any new constitutional right itself. Teague’s general rule of nonretroactivity was also “an exercise of this Court’s power to interpret the federal habeas corpus statute.” For these reasons and
others, the Teague rule limits the types of violations that will
entitle someone to federal habeas corpus relief but does not
affect a state court’s power to grant relief for violations of new
rules of constitutional law when the state is reviewing its own
convictions.
EQUAL PROTECTION AND JURY SELECTION

Snyder v. Louisiana27 is the most recent Supreme Court decision finding that a prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges
violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause
under the principles set forth in Batson v. Kentucky.28 Five
years ago, in Miller-El v. Cockrell,29 the Court held that the Fifth
Circuit erred in denying a certificate of appealability in a federal
habeas corpus case with a Batson claim. When the case
returned to the Court several years later in Miller-El v. Dretke,30
the justices determined that the prosecution discriminated on
the basis of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges. In so
ruling, the Court compared the prosecution’s treatment of white
and nonwhite jurors. In Snyder, the majority again applied a

23. See United States v. Taylor, No. 1:04-CR-160, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 68122 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 5, 2008) (finding no forfeiture
under a preponderance-of-evidence standard); Milan, supra note
22 (noting the standard, and affirming a finding of forfeiture).
24. 128 S.Ct. 1029 (2008).
25. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007).
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comparative analysis and gave greater insight into the trial
judge’s role when there is a Batson objection.
During jury selection in Snyder, 36 prospective jurors survived challenges for cause. Five of the 36 were black. All five
were eliminated by the prosecution through the use of peremptory challenges. When Snyder’s case reached the Supreme
Court, the justices focused on the prosecution’s explanation for
two of the challenges. Batson sets forth a three-step process to
adjudicate a claim that a peremptory challenge was based on
race-purposeful discrimination: First, a party must make a
prima facie showing that the challenge was based on race.
Second, if that showing has been made, the party that exercised
the peremptory challenge must offer a race-neutral reason for
challenging the juror. Third, in light of the parties’ submissions, the trial court must decide whether the objecting party
has shown purposeful discrimination. Snyder, like Miller-El II,
addressed Batson’s third step.
In a 7-2 decision authored by Justice Alito, the Court found
that the prosecution’s reasons for striking a juror were not
shown to be race-neutral. The prosecution offered two reasons
for challenging a black juror. According to the prosecutor, the
juror looked very nervous. In addition, he was a student
teacher who might miss classes, and the prosecution expressed
concerns about whether the juror might come back with a
lesser verdict due to a need to get home quickly. The trial judge
denied defense counsel’s Batson objection, saying only that “I’m
going to allow the challenge.” The trial court did not make any
findings about whether the juror in fact appeared nervous or
whether the prosecutor was credible. Further, the case was
tried in one week, and it seemed clear that this juror would be
able to attend at least a weeklong trial. And applying a comparative analysis, it appeared that the prosecution did not
express similar concerns with respect to white jurors who had
time constraints that were at least as serious as those of the
black juror. The judgment was reversed despite the dissenting
opinion of Justices Scalia and Thomas, who criticized the
majority for second-guessing the fact-based decisions of the
Louisiana courts.
There are a few points to note. The decision is an expression
of the Supreme Court’s continued concern with discrimination
in jury selection and an indication of the Court’s willingness to
review such cases. The majority opinion also provides a second
recent example of comparative juror analysis in assessing the
credibility of a prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations. And the
decision underscores the importance of a trial judge’s on-therecord findings about the credibility of the prosecution’s explanations. In the absence of anything in the record showing that
the trial judge believed the prosecution’s assertion that the challenged juror was nervous, the Supreme Court refused to presume that the judge found the offered race-neutral explanation
to be credible.

26. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
27. 128 S.Ct. 1203 (2008).
28. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
29. 537 U.S. 322 (2003).
30. 545 U.S. 231 (2005).

Kennedy v.
was the third case in the last halfdozen years to hold that a capital sentence could not be
imposed on certain offenders or for certain offenses. In Atkins
v. Virginia32 and Roper v. Simmons,33 the justices ruled that the
execution of mentally retarded persons and juveniles violated
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In Kennedy, a 5-4
decision, the majority ruled that a death sentence for someone
who raped, but did not kill, a child and who did not intend to
assist another in killing the child also violates these amendments.
The majority opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, follows
the general approach of Atkins and Roper to gauge whether
there is a national consensus against capital punishment for the
crime of child rape. In assessing whether a death sentence for
the crime is excessive or cruel and unusual, the justices looked
for objective indicia of societal standards and then analyzed
whether the sentence was disproportionate. The majority
determined that of the 37 jurisdictions (six states plus the federal government) that have the death penalty, only six jurisdictions authorize that sanction for rape of a child. “The evidence
of a national consensus with respect to the death penalty for
child rapists . . . shows divided opinion but, on balance, an
opinion against it.” Further, Louisiana is the only state since
1964 to have sentenced an individual to death for the crime of
child rape. No individual has been executed for the rape of
either an adult or child since 1964, nor has anyone been executed for any non-homicide offense since 1963. The majority
also turned aside the claim that jurisdictions may not have
decided to authorize the death penalty for child rape because
states may have misinterpreted an earlier ruling (which prohibited the death penalty for adult rape) as applying to child victims as well. Then the justices applied their own judgment and
determined that in light of the legitimate purposes of punishment, “the death penalty is not a proportional punishment for
rape of a child.” In an opinion written by Justice Alito, four justices dissented, taking issue with virtually every aspect of the
majority opinion.
After the Court issued its ruling in June 2008, the State
sought rehearing. As it turns out, the majority was not correct
to assert categorically that the federal government does not
authorize the death penalty for the crime of child rape. The
military death penalty for rape has been in place for more than
a century. The rehearing petition was denied, though Justices
Thomas and Alito would have granted the petition. A statement by the five majority justices argues that “authorization of
the death penalty in the military sphere does not indicate that
the penalty is constitutional in the civilian context.”34 Justices
Scalia and the Chief Justice concurred in the denial of rehearing, though they asserted that the new evidence destroys the
majority’s claim that it was discerning a national consensus and
not just giving effect to the majority justices’ own preferences.35
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Kentucky, use the same combination of drugs in their lethalinjection protocols. The first drug, sodium thiopental, is a barbiturate sedative that induces unconsciousness. The second
drug, pancuronium bromide, is a paralytic agent. The third
drug is potassium chloride, which induces cardiac arrest.
Although it was conceded that if the three-drug combination
was properly administered there would be a humane death, the
Petitioners argued that there was a significant risk that
Kentucky’s procedures would not be properly followed. In particular, the Petitioners alleged that the first drug (the barbiturate) is critical and must be provided in sufficient quantity to
prevent severe pain and conscious suffocation when the other
chemicals are administered. As part of their argument, the
Petitioners noted that veterinarians are prohibited from using
the second drug (the paralytic agent) in euthanizing animals in
the overwhelming majority of states. By a 7-2 vote, but one
which failed to produce a majority opinion, the Court found
that Kentucky’s administration of its lethal-injection protocol
does not contravene the Eighth Amendment. It is difficult to
derive a clear rule from the separate opinions in this case.
Perhaps the easiest way to understand the outcome is to compare the three main substantive opinions, and then review the
separate opinions of Justices Alito, Stevens, and Breyer.
The judgment of the Court was announced by Chief Justice
Roberts in an opinion joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito.
The Chief Justice’s opinion focuses upon whether particular
procedures pose a substantial risk of serious harm, which must
be an objectively intolerable risk of harm. The Chief Justice
rejected the claim that simply because an execution method
might result in pain, either by accident or because of an
inescapable consequence of death, there is the sort of objectively intolerable risk of harm that amounts to cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Nor could the petitioners prevail simply by showing that there
is an alternative procedure, such as a single-drug protocol (barbiturates only) that may be preferred. As the Chief Justice put
it, an alternative protocol “must effectively address ‘a substan-

31. 128 S.Ct. 2641 (2008).
32. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
33. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
34. Kennedy v. Louisiana, No. 07-343, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 5449 (Oct. 1,
2008) (Order denying rehearing, and Statement of Justice

Kennedy respecting the denial of rehearing).
35. Kennedy v. Louisiana, No. 07-343, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 5448 (Oct. 1,
2008) (Statement of Justice Scalia respecting the denial of rehearing).
36. 128 S.Ct. 1520 (2008).
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tial risk of serious harm.’” The
alternative procedure “must be
feasible, readily implemented,
and in fact significantly reduce
a substantial risk of severe
pain. If a State refuses to adopt
such alternative in the face of
these documented advantages,
without a legitimate penological justification . . . , then a
State’s refusal to change its
method can be viewed as ‘cruel
and unusual’ under the Eighth
Amendment.” Applying this
test, the Chief Justice found on
this record that the Petitioners
had not shown that the risk of
an inadequate dose of the first
drug, as it is administered in Kentucky, is substantial.
Justices Thomas and Scalia concurred but rejected the Chief
Justice’s formulation. As set forth in Justice Thomas’s concurrence, the two rejected “as both unprecedented and unworkable” any standard that might require courts to weigh the relative advantages and disadvantages of different methods of execution or lethal-injection protocols. In their view, “a method of
execution violates the Eighth Amendment only if it is deliberately designed to inflict pain.” Thus, any comparative analysis
“should be limited to whether the challenged method inherently inflicts significantly more pain than traditional modes of
execution such as hanging and the firing squad.” Justice
Thomas also argued that “today’s decision is sure to engender
more litigation.”
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Souter, dissented. They
agreed with the Petitioners and the plurality “that the degree of
risk, magnitude of pain, and availability of alternatives must be
considered.” However, they disagreed with the Chief Justice’s
opinion with respect to the extent to which the “substantial
risk” test “sets a fixed threshold for the first factor.” Applying
this more flexible test, the dissenters would remand to consider
whether the failure to include additional safeguards to confirm
that the inmate is unconscious after injection of the barbiturate,
in combination with other elements of Kentucky’s protocol, creates an unacceptable and readily avoidable risk of inflicting
severe and unnecessary pain.
Justice Breyer concurred. He agreed with Justice Ginsburg
as to how a court should review this type of Eighth Amendment
claim. However, he could not find in the record or in the literature sufficient evidence to establish that Kentucky’s execution

protocol poses the type of significant and unnecessary risk of
inflicting severe pain that the Petitioners asserted. Justice
Stevens concurred, finding no Eighth Amendment violation on
this record under the test set forth in either the Chief Justice’s
opinion or Justice Ginsburg’s dissent. He used this as an occasion, however, to announce his general view that the death
penalty in the United States is now patently excessive and cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. But being bound by precedent, he joined the
Court’s judgment. Justice Scalia wrote separately to respond to
Justice Stevens. Justice Alito wrote his own concurrence to
respond to the suggestion by Justice Thomas that the case
would result in greater litigation.
From the various opinions, there were three votes for the test
set forth in Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion, three votes for the
dissent’s more flexible test, and two votes for a test that essentially compares modern protocols to the methods of executions
conducted throughout history. Ordinarily, when five justices do
not agree on the rationale for a decision, the views of the members who decide the case on the narrowest grounds represent
the holding of the Court. There is an argument that Baze contains no controlling opinion since it is difficult to characterize
any of the concurring opinions as providing a fifth vote on a
narrower ground than contained in the Chief Justice’s opinion.
Nevertheless, despite the Court’s failure to promulgate a single
standard, seven justices found that the administration of
Kentucky’s execution protocol did not violate the Eighth
Amendment on the record in this case.
In the immediate wake of the decision in Baze, the de facto
moratorium has lifted in a number of jurisdictions with executions taking place by lethal injection in at least Florida, Georgia,
Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia.
But because Baze reviewed only the specific record of
Kentucky’s procedures, litigation has continued as judges apply
Baze to evidence of the administration of lethal-injection protocols in other states.37 Most courts seem to treat Chief Justice
Roberts’s plurality opinion as controlling.38 Courts have tended
to dispose of lethal-injection challenges by comparing their
jurisdiction’s protocol with the evidence discussed in Baze
about the administration of Kentucky’s protocol.39

37. For an online repository of a number of judicial orders relating
to lethal injection, pre- and post-dating Baze, see:
www.lethalinjection.org.
38. See, e.g., Bennett v. State, N0. 2006-DR-01516-SCT, 2008 Miss.
LEXIS 417 (Miss. Aug. 28, 2008); Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d
291(4th Cir. 2008); Jackson v. Houk, No. 3:07CV0400, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 36061 (N.D. Ohio May 1, 2008); Nooner v. Norris,
No. 5:06CV00110, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60136 (E.D. Ark. Aug.
5, 2008); but see Henyard v. State, Nos. SC08-222, SC08-1544,
SC08-1653, 2008 Fla. LEXIS 1609 (Fla. Sept. 10, 2008) (address-

ing the various opinions in Baze and noting that the holding that
Kentucky’s protocol did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment was the only part of the plurality opinion upon which the
majority agreed).
39. See, e.g., State v. Bethel, No. 07AP-810, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS
2322 (Ohio Ct. App. June 5, 2008); Ex parte Chi, 256 S.W.3d 702
(Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2008); Emmett, supra note 38; see also
Moeller v. Weber, Civ. 04-4200, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36190
(D.S.D. May 2, 2008) (ordering discovery to determine whether
South Dakota’s lethal-injection protocol is similar to Kentucky’s).
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FEDERAL CRIMINAL STATUTES AND SENTENCING

The last Term produced important rulings interpreting federal criminal statutes and affecting federal sentencing. The article summarizes a few of the statutory decisions, particularly
those that relate to the interplay of federal and state offenses
(Logan and Burgess) or apply to common add-ons for use of
weapons or explosives (Watson and Ressam). The Court’s sen-

tencing decisions are significant for both state and federal prosecutions, as the Court has continued to enunciate principles
that apply in construing structured sentencing schemes.
Federal Statutes
The Petitioner in Logan v. United States40 was convicted of
being a felon in possession of a firearm. Under the Federal
Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA), he was given an
enhanced sentence on the basis of three misdemeanor battery
convictions from Wisconsin. The ACCA contains an exemption provision, providing that a prior conviction may be disregarded if it “has been expunged, or set aside,” or if the defendant “has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored.”
Logan argued that because he never lost his civil rights as a
result of the three misdemeanor convictions, they fell within
the exemption provision and his federal sentence was improperly enhanced.
The Court unanimously rejected the argument in an opinion
written by Justice Ginsburg. Relying upon the plain language,
history, and context of the statute, the Court found that never
having rights taken away was not the same as having them affirmatively restored. While the ACCA defers to a state’s decision
to relieve an offender from the disabling effects of a conviction,
Congress did not mean to exempt instances where the offender
did not lose civil rights in the first place. Thus, if a state intends
to allow an individual to avoid the ACCA consequences of certain convictions, it must act affirmatively to do so.
In Burgess v. United States,41 the Court resolved a conflict in
the way that prior state convictions might be used to enhance a
federal drug sentence. Some federal drug offenses carry mandatory minimum penalties. A 10-year mandatory minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) is doubled to 20 years if
a defendant has previously been convicted of a “felony drug
offense.” The Petitioner in Burgess had a prior conviction in
South Carolina for possessing cocaine. The State classified the
offense as a misdemeanor although it carried a maximum sentence of two years’ imprisonment. Burgess claimed that the
State’s characterization must control, relying upon 21 U.S.C. §
802(13), which says that a “felony” is any “offense classified by
applicable Federal or State law as a felony.” The government
countered that the controlling definition was the term “felony
drug offense,” described in 21 U.S.C. § 802(44) as an offense
involving drugs that is “punishable by imprisonment for more
than one year under the law of the United States or of a State or
foreign country.” The district court and court of appeals agreed
with the government. The Supreme Court affirmed.
The Court unanimously ruled that the definition set forth in
§ 802(44) alone controls. In an opinion by Justice Ginsburg,
the justices point to a number of statutory features, including
that “felony drug offense” is a term of art within the statute and
the specific definition should control. The Court also determined that the rule of lenity would not apply since there was
no ambiguity to resolve. The specific statutory definition set
forth in § 802(44) is coherent, complete, and exclusive.

40. 128 S.Ct. 475 (2007).
41. 128 S.Ct. 1572 (2008).
42. 128 S.Ct. 579 (2007).

Watson v. United States42
In Burgess v.
addressed the question of
whether a person who trades United States, the
drugs to obtain a gun “uses” a Court resolved a
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conflict in the
to . . . [a] drug trafficking crime”
way that prior
as prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 924
(c) (1) (A). The Petitioner in state convictions
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enhance a
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federal drug
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and an undercover law enforcement agent. He provided the
drugs in exchange for a semiautomatic pistol. Watson was
indicted for a drug offense and for “using” the pistol during and
in relation to that crime. He entered a conditional plea, reserving the right to challenge the factual basis for his conviction.
The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed.
In an opinion by Justice Souter, the Court determined that
someone who provides drugs to obtain a weapon does not “use”
the weapon. Though the justices previously decided in Smith v.
United States43 that trading a weapon to receive drugs is the
“use” of that weapon, the converse is not true. Under the
Court’s precedents, “use” requires active employment of a
firearm. Focusing on the plain language of the statute and its
context, the justices found that a person who gives drugs to
receive a weapon does not actively employ or use the gun.
Justice Ginsburg concurred to urge the Court to overrule Smith.
She also wryly noted that “at least when the subject is guns,”
“[i]t is better to receive than to give.”
Ressam v. United States44 involved an interesting (though less
common) offense and a direct link to the “war on terror.”
Ahmed Ressam came to the United States with explosives, planning to detonate them at the Los Angeles International Airport.
He was arrested entering the country and made false statements
on a customs declaration. He was convicted in federal court of
a number of criminal offenses, including carrying explosives
“during the commission of any [federal] felony” in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2). The government’s theory was that
Ressam had carried explosives during the commission of the
felony of making false statements on a customs declaration.
The court of appeals reversed his conviction on the § 844(h)(2)
count, finding that the carrying of the explosives had to be in
relation to the commission of the other felony, and that no such
relationship was shown here. Attorney General Michael
Mukasey personally argued on behalf of the government in the
Supreme Court, which reversed by a vote of 8-1.
The Court’s opinion, authored by Justice Stevens, provides
that the plain language of the statute requires reversal. The term
“during” denotes a temporal link to the other felony, but the
statute contains no other qualification. The statute merely

43. 508 U.S. 223 (1993).
44. 128 S.Ct. 1858 (2008).
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requires that an explosive be
carried contemporaneously
with the commission of
another felony not that it be in
relation to or somehow further
the commission of that felony.
Although the Court was concerned during oral argument
that a broad construction of
the statute could lead to
absurd results or give extraordinary leverage to prosecutors,
the majority opinion does not
address those concerns. They
are reflected in the dissenting
opinion of Justice Breyer, who
argues that because the term
“explosives” includes such
commonplace materials as gasoline or fertilizer, and the category
of federal felony offenses is so broad, the Court’s construction
may lead to strange results. From the context of the statute, he
would find a requirement that the explosives be carried in relation to the other felony.
Federal Sentencing
The Court has been extraordinarily active over the last
decade in reviewing the constitutionality of federal and state
sentencing schemes. Some of the most important decisions in
recent years include Blakely v. Washington45 and Cunningham v.
California,46 where the justices found that sentences imposed
under Washington’s guidelines and California’s determinatesentencing law violate the Sixth Amendment right to trial by
jury, and United States v. Booker,47 where the Court essentially
saved the United States Sentencing Guidelines by rendering
them “effectively advisory.” Two cases decided on the same day
last Term dealt with some of the impact of making the Federal
Guidelines advisory. If judges are no longer strictly bound by
the Guidelines, what force do they carry? Must judges respect
all policy determinations that are reflected in Guidelines
ranges? And how do courts of appeals review sentencing decisions that substantially depart from applicable Guidelines
ranges?
In Kimbrough v. United States,48 the Petitioner was convicted
of serious federal drug and weapons offenses. The drug crimes
involved crack as well as powder cocaine; for over 20 years,
federal crack-cocaine offenses have carried higher Guidelines
and statutory sentences than offenses related to powder
cocaine. The statutory minimum for Kimbrough’s offenses was
15 years, though his guideline range was 228-270 months (19
to 22 1/2 years). The guideline range for an equivalent amount
of powder cocaine would have been 97-106 months. Taking
into account the much criticized distinction between crack-

and powder-cocaine sentences, the district court sentenced
Kimbrough to the statutory minimum of 15 years. The court
of appeals vacated the sentence, but the Supreme Court
reversed.
In a 7-2 decision authored by Justice Ginsburg, the Court
noted that sentencing judges may vary from Guidelines ranges
based upon policy considerations, including disagreement with
a policy of imposing much higher sentences in crack-cocaine
cases. The majority specifically rejected the government’s argument that federal courts are required by Congress to respect the
100:1 ratio of amounts of powder to crack cocaine that lead to
equivalent Guidelines ranges. While courts must still give
“respectful consideration” to the Guidelines, they are freed
from this ratio and the mandatory strictures of the Guidelines.
District courts should follow the instruction in Booker that sentences must be imposed that are sufficient but not greater than
necessary to accomplish the various goals of sentencing
described in federal statutes. Justices Thomas and Alito dissented. Justice Thomas continues to disagree with the remedial
holding in Booker. Justice Alito would require sentencing
judges to give significant weight to the policy decisions in the
Guidelines (including, as here, various ratios), and would thus
remand for reconsideration.
Gall v. United States49 addressed a somewhat different problem: how to review the reasonableness of a federal sentence
that is substantially below the applicable Guidelines range. The
Petitioner in Gall joined a drug conspiracy but withdrew on his
own and stopped selling drugs of any kind. Gall was arrested
for conspiracy several years later, after he graduated from college and found a job. He pleaded guilty. The applicable
Guidelines range was 30-37 months, but the judge sentenced
him to three years’ probation, which the district court reasoned
was sufficient but not greater than necessary to serve the statutory purposes of sentencing. The court of appeals reversed.
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals.
In a 7-2 decision and an opinion by Justice Stevens, the
majority found that the sentence was reasonable. While a previous ruling of the Supreme Court had determined that in the
ordinary case a reviewing court may presume that a sentence
within the Guidelines is reasonable, all sentences are reviewed
under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Though the
extent of the difference between a particular sentence and the
recommended Guidelines range is relevant, the Court rejected
a rule that would require extraordinary circumstances or some
specific showing to justify a sentence that is outside of the
Guidelines or even outside of the Guidelines range by a particular degree.50 The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals
because its analysis appeared to resemble de novo review. The
circuit failed to give due deference to the sentencing court’s reasoned decision that the statutory factors, on the whole, justified
the sentence. As in Kimbrough, Justices Thomas and Alito dissented.

45. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
46. 549 U.S. 270 (2007).
47. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
48. 128 S.Ct. 558 (2007).

49. 128 S.Ct. 586 (2007).
50. Though Gall has not been discussed much in state appellate
courts, for an interesting debate about the use of Gall as guidance,
see People v. Smith, 754 N.W.2d 284 (Mich. 2008).
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Boumediene v. Bush51 was one of the blockbusters of the
Term. Although the ruling directly concerns detainees at
Guantánamo Bay, whose cases are pending before a limited
number of courts, the decision should be of interest to a wide
audience. Boumediene is now the leading case on the
Suspension Clause,52 the scope of common-law habeas corpus,
and what procedures might provide an adequate substitute for
habeas corpus.
In previous rulings, the Court determined that the privilege
of habeas corpus extends to detainees at Guantánamo Bay.
Further, the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) did not
remove then pending habeas corpus cases from the federal
courts.
In response, Congress passed the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA). In Boumediene, a 5-4 majority found, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, that the MCA was
intended to strip pending cases from the federal courts.
However, because the Act did not purport to be a formal suspension of the writ, the detainees could still challenge the
legality of their confinement. The question then became
whether the MCA could avoid a Suspension Clause challenge
because Congress has provided adequate substitute procedures
for habeas corpus.
To answer this question, the majority set out some basic
principles of common-law habeas corpus. The privilege of
habeas corpus “entitles the prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to ‘the erroneous application or interpretation’ of relevant law.” A habeas
corpus court must have the power to order the conditional
release of someone who is unlawfully detained, although
release need not be the exclusive remedy and is not the appropriate remedy in every case in which the writ is granted. The
majority opinion also notes that “where relief is sought from a
sentence that resulted from the judgment of a court of record,
as is the case in most federal habeas cases, there is considerable
deference owed to the court that ordered confinement.” Of
course, the criminal conviction “in the usual course occurs
after judicial hearing before a tribunal disinterested in the outcome and committed to procedures designed to ensure its own
independence.” But where a person is detained by executive
order rather than after trial and conviction in a court, “the need
for collateral review is most pressing.” The Court then
reviewed the few previous cases finding that statutory procedures were adequate substitutes for the writ, such as the decision upholding 28 U.S.C. § 2255–the motion procedure that
allows federal prisoners to challenge their convictions and sentences, and a case upholding restrictions on successive petitions
under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which
were found not to amount to a substantial departure from common-law habeas corpus.
The majority ruled that under these principles, and by contrast with these prior cases, the procedures afforded to
detainees at Guantánamo Bay are not an adequate substitute for
habeas corpus. To begin with, the administrative forum for
contesting detention–the Combatant Status Review Tribunal

(CSRT)–constrains a detainee’s
To answer this
ability to rebut the factual basis
question, the
for the claim that the person is
an enemy combatant. There is a
majority set out
limited means to find or present
some basic
evidence, and the detainee does
principles of
not have the assistance of counsel. There is a risk inherent in
common-law
any process that is closed and
habeas corpus.
accusatorial, said the Court, and
the risk is too significant to
ignore given that the consequences of error may be detention
for the duration of hostilities that could last a generation or
more. In addition, the DTA affords only limited judicial review
of the administrative determination. Because a reviewing court
is essentially limited to the question of whether the CSRT followed appropriate and lawful standards and procedures, it cannot consider newly discovered evidence that could not have
been part of the administrative record, and that evidence might
be critical to a detainee’s argument that he is not an enemy combatant.
In light of the CSRT process, the majority concluded that the
detainees’ access to the courts under the statutory review provisions of the DTA is not an adequate substitute for the writ of
habeas corpus. Thus, the MCA–which would strip federal
courts of the power to consider habeas petitions by these
detainees–effects an unconstitutional suspension of the writ.
Four justices dissented. The dissenting opinion by Chief
Justice Roberts takes on, among other points, the majority’s
finding that the CSRT and DTA procedures are not adequate
substitutes for the writ of habeas corpus.
Though Boumediene directly applies to a limited number of
individuals, it should stand as a cornerstone case on the meaning of the Suspension Clause, the scope of common-law habeas
corpus, and on which procedures may be an adequate substitute for habeas corpus.
In Allen v. Siebert,53 a much less momentous case (but one
still worthy of comment), the Court granted the State’s petition
for a writ of certiorari and summarily reversed the court of
appeals. The case is notable for its explanation of how a state’s
dismissal of a post-conviction petition may impact the timeliness of a subsequent federal habeas corpus petition.
Siebert filed his state post-conviction petition after the expiration of a state statute of limitations, and it was dismissed as
untimely. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 contains a one-year statute of limitations that is tolled
while “a properly filed application for State post-conviction or
other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment
or claim is pending.”54 Siebert filed a federal habeas corpus
petition, which the district court dismissed as untimely. The
federal court of appeals disagreed, finding that Siebert’s state
petition was “properly filed” because the time bar was not jurisdictional and the state courts had discretion whether to enforce
it. In so ruling, the circuit distinguished a prior case from the
Court in which a petition was not found to be “properly filed”

51. 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008).
52. U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 2.

53. 128 S.Ct. 2 (2007) (per curiam).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
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where the state’s time bar was jurisdictional.55 Reversing, the
Supreme Court said, in a per curiam opinion, that whether a
time limit “is jurisdictional, an affirmative defense, or something in between,” it is a condition to filing. Justices Stevens
and Ginsburg dissented and would have adopted the distinction
found by the court of appeals.
A LOOK AHEAD

An early look at the Supreme Court’s October 2008 Term
shows that the Fourth and Sixth Amendments are back on the
menu, along with issues relating to qualified immunity for officers and prosecutors, and a matter of particular importance to
capital defendants. Though these cases are significant, there do
not yet seem to be the same sort of blockbusters that marked
the October 2007 Term’s criminal docket.
As of the opening of the October 2008 Term, the Court has
granted review in four search-and-seizure cases: Herring v.
United States,56 which asks if evidence must be suppressed
under the Fourth Amendment where officers conduct an arrest
and search incident to an arrest in reliance upon credible but
erroneous information provided by another officer; Arizona v.
Gant,57 which concerns whether officers must demonstrate a
threat to their safety or a need to preserve evidence to justify a
warrantless vehicular search incident to arrest after the vehicle’s
recent occupants have been arrested and secured; Arizona v.
Johnson,58 which addresses whether an officer who stops a car
for a minor traffic infraction may pat-down a passenger if the
officer has an articulable basis to believe that the passenger is
armed and dangerous but the officer has no reason to believe
that the passenger is committing a criminal offense; and
Pearson v. Callahan,59 which asks, among other things, whether
a “consent once removed” exception to the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement authorizes police to enter a home without
a warrant after an informant buys drugs inside.
Pearson may also provide a vehicle for a significant qualified
immunity ruling. The justices directed the parties to brief and
argue whether the qualified immunity decision in Saucier v.
Katz60 should be overruled. A second case involving qualified
immunity is Van De Kamp v. Goldstein,61 which asks whether the
doctrine shields the decisions of supervisors who direct policy
and oversee training with respect to prosecutors’ constitutional
duty to disclose exculpatory evidence.
The Court has agreed to hear two Sixth Amendment rightto-counsel cases. Kansas v. Ventris62 asks whether the prosecution may impeach a defendant with statements obtained without a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. In Montejo v. Louisiana,63 the justices will
decide if, after the Sixth Amendment has attached, a defendant
who asks for counsel and is appointed a lawyer must take an
affirmative step to “accept” the appointment to receive the pro-

55. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005).
56. No. 07-513.
57. No. 07-542.
58. No. 07-1122.
59. No. 07-751.
60. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
61. No. 07-854.
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tections of the amendment and preclude police-initiated interrogation without counsel.
Other provisions of the Sixth Amendment are also before
the Court. Vermont v. Brillon64 asks whether trial delays relating
to the appointment and representation of counsel may be attributable to the state and deny a defendant a speedy trial. A
Crawford case is on the docket.
Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts65 concerns whether a state forensic analyst’s laboratory report, prepared for use in a criminal case, is “testimonial” evidence that is subject to the requirements of the
Confrontation Clause. In Rivera v. Illinois,66 the Court will take
up the question whether the erroneous denial of a defendant’s
peremptory challenge requires automatic reversal of a conviction. And the justices have granted review in another
Apprendi/Blakely case. In Oregon v. Ice,67 they will decide
whether the Sixth Amendment requires that facts necessary for
the imposition of consecutive sentences, other than facts relating to prior convictions, must be found by the jury or admitted
by the defendant.
An important case for capital defendants is Harbison v. Bell.68
Typically, state clemency proceedings are at the end of the road;
they come after a death sentence has been affirmed by the state
courts and after the defendant has lost his or her federal habeas
corpus petition. Harbison will decide whether the statute that
provides federal funds for counsel who represent state capital
defendants in federal habeas corpus proceedings includes funding for counsel to continue their representation and pursue
State clemency proceedings.
All-in-all, the October 2008 Term promises a bevy of important criminal law and procedure decisions, even if it lacks some
of the fireworks provided by last year’s headliners.
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When Should Judges Use Alcohol
Monitoring as a Sentencing
Option in DWI Cases?
Victor E. Flango and Fred Cheesman

T

raditional sentencing sanctions have not been particularly
effective against people caught driving while impaired
(DWI) and less so against repeat offenders. Technology
has provided judges with some new sentencing options,
including various forms of electronic home monitoring. This
article takes an initial step toward evaluating the effectiveness
of alcohol monitoring as a sentencing option in DWI cases
with the goal of eventually determining which types of offenders, if any, would benefit most from alcohol monitoring. The
constant monitoring of alcohol consumption is thought to aid
rehabilitation by providing a deterrent to drinking and a positive reinforcement to sobriety. It permits offenders to remain
employed, to fulfill family obligations, and to remain in treatment.
Judges may be less familiar with transdermal methods that
monitor alcohol through the skin than with blood, breath, or
urine testing.1 There are two transdermal measuring devices—
the Wrist Transdermal Alcohol Sensor (WrisTAS) by Giner,
Inc., and the Secure Continuous Remote Alcohol Monitor
(SCRAM) bracelet by Alcohol Monitoring Systems, Inc. The
former device, though clinically tested, is not yet commercially
available perhaps because it is not yet sufficiently water or tamper resistant.2
This article reports on the results of a preliminary study
using SCRAM—a passive system that provides 24-hour monitoring of alcohol consumption.3 SCRAM, which became commercially available in 2003, is attached to the ankle and detects
alcohol from continuous samples of vaporous or insensible
perspiration (sweat) collected from the air above the skin and
transmits that data via the web.4 Anti-circumvention features

include a tamper clip, an obstruction sensor, a temperature
sensor, and communication monitoring to ensure that the
bracelet is functioning normally and transmitting information
on the designated offender.
At the request of Alcohol Monitoring Systems, the National
Center for State Courts (NCSC) conducted a preliminary
examination of the SCRAM bracelet to determine its effectiveness in reducing recidivism while it was worn and after it was
removed. One purpose of the study was to determine the key
influences on the effectiveness of the SCRAM bracelet so that
a more extensive, experimental study could be designed.
Another purpose was to develop hypotheses with regard to the
types of offenders on whom the SCRAM bracelet is most likely
to be effective so that judges can determine which offenders
would most benefit from the use of SCRAM. Alcohol
Monitoring Systems recommends its use for repeat “hard-core”
offenders.5
This preliminary study was dependent upon available data
so it was not possible to explore all of the implications of the
SCRAM bracelet. In particular, we lacked information on the
treatment options used by offenders while the SCRAM bracelet
was being worn.6 Consequently, this can only be presented as
preliminary findings until a more extensive, experimental
study can be conducted. Nevertheless, there are some key
lessons that judges may take from this early research.

The authors are grateful to Alcohol Monitoring Systems for funding
this research and to Steve Talpins for his questions. They thank the
SCRAM provider in North Carolina, Rehabilitation Support Services
of North Carolina, Inc., for providing data on the SCRAM wearers and
Vantage Point Services for providing the criminal-history data. They
also acknowledge the bibliographic assistance of Joan Cochet, NCSC
librarian.

4. Robertson, Vanlaar, and Simpson, op. cit., 2.
5. “Hard-core” drunk drivers are defined as “those who drive with a
high blood alcohol concentration of .15 or above, who do so
repeatedly, as demonstrated by having more than one drunk-driving arrest, and who are highly resistant to changing their behavior despite previous sanctions, treatment or education.” The
National Association of State Judicial Educators and the Century
Council, Hardcore Drunk Driving Judicial Guide (2004), p. 4
6. The SCRAM service provider, Rehabilitation Support Services of
North Carolina, provided data on the treatment group, all offenders that used SCRAM after conviction (i.e., as a condition of their
sentence) during the sampling period (N=114). Vantage Point
Services, a private firm, was hired to (1) provide criminal-history
data on the sample of SCRAM users and to (2) randomly select
and provide similar data for a pool of 3,000 DWI offenders that
did not use SCRAM, using North Carolina’s Statewide Criminal
Information System.

Footnotes
1. As are most people, see J. S. Hawthorne and M. H. Wojcik,
“Transdermal Alcohol Measurement: A Review of the Literature,”
Canadian Society of Forensic Science Journal 39 (2006): 65.
2. R. Robertson, W. Vanlaar, and H. Simpson, Continuous
Transdermal Alcohol Monitoring: A Primer for Criminal Justice
Professionals (Ottawa: Traffic Injury Research Foundation,
October 2006), p. 14.
3. See www.alcoholmonitoring.com.
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THE CONTEXT FOR ALCOHOL MONITORING

Before presenting the key findings from our research, let us
put alcohol monitoring in context of other sentencing options.
The most prevalent sanctions imposed against people con-

victed of driving while impaired are incarceration, community
service, fines, and license suspension.7 These sanctions have
been an effective deterrent for many types of crimes but appear
to be less effective for DWI offenders.
Incarceration involves some form of
correctional supervision. Many states
have adopted mandatory jail sentences
for misdemeanor DWI and prison sentences for felony DWI. Incarceration,
however, is expensive. Although many
participants in a NHTSA survey
expressed a fear of jail, many said jail
alone would not change their behavior.8
Only slight evidence exists that jail sentences reduce recidivism.9 Incarceration, however, can also be an opportunity to place offenders into residential
treatment programs, such as special
DWI facilities or weekend intervention
programs.10
Fines have not been well evaluated
for their impact on recidivism. They
may be effective deterrents if set high
enough, but many fines are not collected or can be paid in small increments over a long period of
time and, thus, do not place a substantial financial burden on
the offender.11
Respondents to the American Judges Association’s survey
suggested that suspended sentences and community service
were the least effective sanctions against DWI. A majority of
people with revoked or suspended licenses drove anyway,
according to the NHTSA survey mentioned above, but tried to

be more careful so they wouldn’t be detected.12 Similarly, an
extensive study in Louisiana, using both self-reports and crash
data, did not find evidence of reduced recidivism for offenders
sentenced to community-service programs.13
The effectiveness of probation in
preventing DWI recidivism depends,
in large part, on the conditions
imposed and the level of supervision
associated with the probation.
Variations include basic supervision
probation (monthly visits), unsupervised probation, and individualized
restrictions. Intensive supervision
probation provides offenders with
more contact with probation officers
and participation in education and
therapeutic programs in the community.14 Under intensive supervision,
offenders retain their freedom but are
subject to requirements such as curfews, electronic monitoring, drug testing, daily contacts, and mandatory
community service.15
Electronic monitoring is as effective as incarceration, and
less expensive.16 Courts use electronically monitored home
detention to limit the nighttime and recreational driving of
DWI offenders and use other devices to electronically monitor
breath alcohol concentration.17 For example, in a DUI
Intensive Supervision Program in Multnomah County Circuit
Court, Judge Dorothy Baker uses an electronic monitoring and
a telephone-based remote-alcohol-testing device in conjunc-

7. See the “Introduction” in W. Brunson and P. Knighten (eds.)
Strategies for Addressing the DWI Offender: 10 Promising Sentencing
Practices (Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 2004) p.7.
8. C. Wiliszowski et al. ”Determine Reasons for Repeat Drinking and
Driving,” DOT HS 808 401 May 1996 cited in “Introduction,”
footnote 1.
9. J. L. Nichols and H. L. Ross, “The Effectiveness of Legal Sanctions
in Dealing with Drinking Drivers.” U.S. Public Health Service,
Report to the Surgeon General (Surgeon General’s Workshop on
Drunk Driving: Background Papers, 1989), p. 101.
10. For a description of these types of special programs, see National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration and the National Institute
on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, A Guide to Sentencing DWI
Offenders, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, 2005), cited hereafter as A Guide to
Sentencing DWI Offenders.
11. R. Voas and D. A. Fisher, “Court Procedures for Handling
Intoxicated Drivers,” Alcohol Research and Health (Winter 2001)
p. 4.
12. Wiliszowski, loc.cit.
13. J. L. Nichols and H. L. Ross, “The Effectiveness of Legal Sanctions
in Dealing with Drinking Drivers,” U.S. Public Health Service,
Report to the Surgeon General (Surgeon General’s Workshop on
Drunk Driving: Background Papers, 1989), p. 102.
14. Thomson lists six ways in which supervision is intensive: 1) it is

extensive with multiple, weekly face-to face contacts, 2) it is
focused on specific behavior regulations governing curfews, drug
use, travel, employment and community service, 3) it is ubiquitous with offenders frequently subjected to random drug tests and
unannounced curfew checks, 4) it is graduated with offenders
proceeding through phases, 5) it is enforced with penalties for
noncompliance and new arrests, and 6) it is coordinated. D.
Thomson, Intensive Probation Supervision in Illinois (Chicago:
Center for Research in Law and Justice, 1985).
15. J.M. Byrne, A. J. Lurigio, and C. Baird, The Effectiveness of the New
Intensive Supervision Programs, RESEARCH IN CORRECTIONS
series (September 1989), p. 8.
16. Mike Haddon, Gary Franchina, and Ron Gordon, DUI Best
Sentencing Practices Guidebook (Salt Lake City: Utah Sentencing
Commission), VI-4. See also A. K. Schmidt, “Electronic
Monitoring of Offenders Increases,” NIJ Reports (Washington,
D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 1989) pp 2-5. Peggy Conway,
editor of the Journal of Offender Monitoring, estimates 130,000
monitoring units are deployed daily in the United States, quoted
in Robert S. Gable and Kirkland R. Gable, “The Practical
Limitations and Positive Potential of Electronic Monitoring,”
Corrections Compendium (September/October, 2007).
17. Robert B. Voas “Technological Developments Open New
Opportunities to Reduce the Recidivism of Convicted Drinking
Drivers,” in FrontLines: Linking Alcohol Services Research and
Practice. (Washington, D.C.: NIAAA, September 2004), p. 6.
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Electronic monitoring
is as effective as
incarceration, and
less expensive.

tion with drug testing,
intensive probation, or
court-based tracking, but
the distinguishing features
of this program are the
requirements that offenders
submit to polygraph tests

likely, that many people drive impaired numerous
times before they are apprehended. One survey estimated that the number of times a person drives
drunk before being arrested is 300.19

STUDY DESIGN

To overcome, the first of these difficulties, 114 SCRAM
wearers were matched more closely with a subsample of the
entire pool of 2,985 offenders. This matching led to a comparison group of 261 people who were similar to SCRAM wearers in:

The conclusions in this study are based on a comparison of
offenders who wore the SCRAM ankle bracelet in North
Carolina over the past two years. How did the characteristics
of SCRAM wearers compare to the pool of nearly 3,000 offenders (2,985 to be precise) who did not wear the SCRAM ankle
bracelet?

• age (33.6 years old versus 32.8 years old for the SCRAM
sample);
• race (37.5% nonwhite versus 27.2%);
• sex (13.4% female versus 11.4%); and
• county where conviction took place.

and sell all vehicles they own. 18

• Age: Those sentenced to the SCRAM ankle bracelet were
almost three years younger on the average than other offenders.
• Race: Those sentenced to wear the SCRAM ankle bracelet
were more likely to be white and less likely to be Hispanic
than other offenders.
• Sex: Those sentenced to wear the SCRAM anklet were predominantly male, and the female population was about
equal proportionally to the pool of offenders (11.4% and
13.5%, respectively).
• County: Almost all of those sentenced to the SCRAM ankle
bracelet were from Mecklenburg and Gaston counties, but
the offenders in the pool were primarily from Mecklenburg,
Wake, and Buncombe counties.
• Recidivism: After the ankle braclet was removed, the
recidivism rate of the 114 SCRAM wearers was 17.5% compared to a rate of 26.9% for the offenders as a whole. This
difference is significant in that it could occur by chance less
than three times in a hundred. SCRAM wearers tended to
recidivate sooner than other offenders, 221 days versus 275
days, respectively, but that difference was not statistically
significant.

Even after matching on these characteristics, however, there
were some differences between the SCRAM users and the comparison group:
• number of prior DWI offences (1.5 versus 1.1 for SCRAM
group);
• prior offenses in general (6.1 versus 7.5); and
• number of charges (1.5 versus 1.2).
It appears as if judges are selecting the more serious, repeat
offenders as candidates for the SCRAM ankle bracelet.
Comparing those offenders sentenced to wear SCRAM
bracelets with this matched set of offenders leads to the preliminary conclusions listed below.
RESULTS FROM THE PRELIMINARY EVALUATION OF
SCRAM

(1) This recidivism figure is an overall rate and does not
take into account differences in characteristics of
SCRAM wearers versus the general offender population, such as age and race.
(2) Although recidivism is perhaps the best measure of
success available, it is flawed because it depends not
only upon the offender driving while impaired but
also being caught driving while impaired. That at
least partially depends upon the levels of enforcement in each community. It is not only possible, but

SCRAM WORKS BEST WITH REPEAT OFFENDERS
Comparing the SCRAM ankle bracelet wearers to the
matched comparison set diminishes the difference in recidivism rates to the point where the differences are not statistically significant. The recidivism rate for any crime for the
SCRAM wearers was 17.5% compared to 20.3% for the
matched group. If the comparison is restricted to only the
more “hard-core” offenders, the differences are more pronounced. When only offenders with at least two prior offences
are considered, the differences in recidivism between SCRAM
wearers at 15.7% and the matched set at 28.6% were much
greater.
When considering prior DWI offence recidivism only, the
differences were 2.6% for SCRAM wearers versus 4.6% for the
comparison group. The tendency for SCRAM wearers to
recidivate sooner than other offenders continued with the
matched group (221 days versus 296 days respectively).

18. State of Oregon, Office of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Program, DUII
Program Operations Guide, 1995, as cited in S.C. Lapham, J.C.
deBaca, J. Lapidus, and G. P. McMillan, “Randomized Sanctions to
Reduce Re-Offense Among Repeat Impaired-Driving Offenders,”

102 Addiction (2007) 1619.
19. R. B. Voas and J. M. Hause, “Deterring the Drinking Driver: The
Stockton Experience,” Accident Analysis and Prevention 19 (1987):
81-90.

Two caveats are necessary here:
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After statistically controlling for multiple differences
between the SCRAM wearers and other offenders,20 SCRAM
users have a lower probability of recidivism than the matched
set until a long time after their arrest (1,240 days or 3.4 years),
when they become more likely to recidivate than their comparison group.21
SCRAM IS EFFECTIVE WHEN WORN
People are very unlikely to recidivate while wearing a
SCRAM anklet. In our sample of 114 people wearing the
SCRAM bracelet, only two committed a new offense while
wearing the anklet. This result is consistent with the findings
of the effectiveness of Minnesota’s Remote Electronic Alcohol
Monitoring (REAM) program, which found that very few
arrests for new DWI offenses occurred while participants were
enrolled in the program.22 In that respect, the SCRAM ankle
bracelet may be analogous to ignition interlock devices.
Recidivism rates for ignition interlocks decreased between 50%
and 95% while on the automobile, but once it is removed,
“recidivism rates gradually increase to match the rates of those
who never had an ignition interlock.”23

SCRAM SHOULD BE
The ever
USED IN COMBINATION
increasing cost of
WITH TREATMENT
The treatment model
incarceration and
focuses on protecting public
the lack of success
safety by attacking directly
of traditional . . .
the root cause of DWI: alcohol and substance abuse.
sanctions have
There is little in the literacaused courts to
ture about alcohol-monitorexplore other
ing devices, or electronic
alternatives.
monitoring devices in general, to suggest that monitoring in and of itself will
have a long-term influence on offender behavior. SCRAM, as
well as other monitoring devices, should be used in conjunction with treatment for alcohol and drug addiction to keep
offenders sober long enough for treatment to have an impact.
Compliance with treatment is verified by frequent testing for
alcohol and drug abuse, close community supervision, and frequent court hearings. Incentives are most effective if they
occur shortly after progress is made. Positive monitoring can
be used to “document and reinforce small behavioral improvements while they are occurring in the offender’s usual social
environment.”26

SCRAM NEEDS TO BE WORN AT LEAST 90 DAYS
A key factor in determining the effectiveness of the SCRAM
ankle bracelet is the length of time it is worn. The ankle
bracelet should be worn at least 90 days although that is the
very minimum amount of time needed to remain sober while
on a treatment program for alcohol and/or drug addiction.24
Offenders who wore the SCRAM bracelet at least 90 days and
who had at least two prior DWI convictions had a lower probability of re-offending than other DWI offenders.
In comparison to the matched set, offenders who wore the
SCRAM anklet for more than 90 days recidivated at half the
rate of offenders who wore the ankle bracelet for less than 90
days (10% versus 20%). The recidivism rate of SCRAM users
that wore the anklet for less than 90 days was nearly identical
to the rate of offenders who did not wear a SCRAM bracelet.
Research indicates that 90 days may be the minimum threshold to have treatment take effect. For addictions in general, six
to twelve months of treatment may be necessary to achieve
sobriety.25

SUMMARY
The ever increasing cost of incarceration and the lack of
success of traditional sentencing sanctions have caused courts
to explore other alternatives. The growth in DWI courts27 has
resulted in extending the length and increasing the intensity of
offender monitoring to allow time for that treatment to work.
DWI courts are expensive to operate in part because of the cost
of monitoring, which is why alcohol-monitoring solutions are
promising. SCRAM is a particularly promising alternative
because it not only deters recidivism while in operation but,
when used in combination with treatment, also allows for the
possibility of changing offender behavior.
The American Correctional Associations’, Standards for
Electronic Monitoring Programs suggests an individualized plan
should be completed for each offender before a personal mon-

20. The multivariate technique employed here is a survival-analysis
technique known as “Cox regression.”
21. As one caveat, it must be noted that data from the SCRAM group
was available for 3,000 days post-arrest and from the comparison
group only 1,500 days post-arrest, so it is not possible to determine what happened to recidivism of the comparison after 1,500
days, whereas it is possible to determine that recidivism for the
SCRAM group stabilized after 1,240 days.
22. Minnesota Department of Corrections, “Remote Electronic
Alcohol Monitoring 2004 Report,” as quoted in Judge Michael
Barrasse, “Promising Sentencing Practice No. 6: Electronic
Monitoring and SCRAM,” in W. Brunson and P. Knighten (eds.)
Strategies for Addressing the DWI Offender: 10 Promising Sentencing
Practices (Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 2004), p. 38.
23. J. Mejeur, “Ignition Interlocks: Turn the Key and Blow,” State
Legislatures (December 2007), 16-21 at 21.

24. For purposes of comparison, it is interesting to note that the Utah
Sentencing Commission notes that suspensions must last at least
three months to be effective in reducing recidivism and ideally
should last between 12 and 18 months with respect to another
intervention or license suspensions. Mike Haddon, Gary
Franchina, and Ron Gordon, DUI Best Sentencing Practices
Guidebook (Salt Lake City: Utah Sentencing Commission), chapter 3.
25. D. Marlowe, D. DeMatteo, and D. Festinger, “A Sober Assessment
of Drug Courts,“ 16 Federal Sentencing Reporter (2003) 1-5.
26. Robert S. Gable and Kirkland R. Gable, “The Practical Limitations
and Positive Potential of Electronic Monitoring,” Corrections
Compendium (September/October, 2007), p. 40.
27. V. E. Flango and C.R. Flango, “What’s Happening with DWI
Courts?” in C. Flango, C. Campbell and N. Kauder (eds.), Future
Trends in State Courts, 2006 (Williamsburg, VA: National Center
for State Courts).
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itoring device is installed.28 Other professional guidelines suggest a risk assessment.29 A comparable set of criteria may be a
good idea for judges as well.
To develop such a plan, judges need to know which candidates are best for each sentencing alternative. This study
attempted to examine the offenders who would most benefit
from the use of a SCRAM ankle bracelet. Although based upon
a decent sample size, this preliminary study was conducted in
only one location and did not have the luxury of using random
assignment of offenders to SCRAM to produce definitive conclusions. Much more work is needed to determine the types of
treatment options best used in conjunction with the SCRAM
bracelet to reduce recidivism or at least to increase the time
until the next offense.
Nevertheless, this preliminary study was able to produce
the findings discussed above. Key among these findings are: 1)
The SCRAM ankle bracelet is most effective when used with
hard-core offenders who had at least two prior DWI convictions; 2) SCRAM is effective when worn; 3) SCRAM sentences
are not be recommended for periods of less than 90 days;
indeed, the ankle bracelet may need to be worn for six months
or a year to be most effective.
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Roadside Seizures of
Medical Marijuana:
Public Safety and Public Policy as Limitations upon Transporting
and the Return of Lawfully Seized Medical Marijuana
Cameron Mostaghim

In November 2007, a California Court of Appeal issued a
decision in Garden Grove v. Superior Court1 that requires local
police officers to return medical marijuana to a qualified
patient, despite a lawful search and seizure subsequent to a
moving motor vehicle violation. The effect of this ruling, in at
least some instances, will be to place marijuana back into the
hands of a person who is a risk to public safety while driving
under the influence or is engaged in the “diversion”2 of medical marijuana through unlawful transporting.
A qualified patient is authorized to possess and use medical
marijuana that adheres to certain general quantity guidelines.
While adhering to the general quantity guideline limits for
which possession is allowed by law, a person could transport
marijuana for his or her use and thereafter drive under the
influence or, alternatively, could unlawfully divert medical
marijuana for nonmedical purposes. States have the right to
exercise their police powers for the benefit of public health,
safety, and welfare. This article proposes a presumption limiting a qualified patient or primary caregiver’s3 right to transport
medical marijuana within a motor vehicle to protect against
driving under the influence, reduce unlawful diversions, and
ensure compliance with medical marijuana laws.4 This presumption, under certain circumstances, allows for a forfeiture
of medical marijuana that is presumably possessed for nonmedical purposes.
In addressing the Garden Grove decision, this article relies
upon public safety and public policy to justify the forfeiture
and destruction of medical marijuana following lawful seizure

Editor’s Note: This article was the winning entrant in the American
Judges Association’s annual essay competition for law students.
Author’s Note: Special thanks to Professor Carole Buckner for agreeing to oversee the writing of this article, providing insightful feedback, and constructive criticism. In addition, I would like to express
my gratitude to God for providing the life experiences that directed
me toward the study of law.
Footnotes
1. City of Garden Grove v. Super. Ct. of Orange Co., 157 Cal. App.
4th 355 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2007).
2. “Diversion” of medical marijuana, as hereafter used, means any
nonmedical purpose or use but especially distribution, sharing,
resale, and recreational use.
3. Further references to “patient” or “caregiver” means a “qualified
patient” and “primary caregiver,” respectively, within the meaning of California’s medical marijuana laws. Cal. Health & Safety
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from a motor vehicle. This presumption, while making an
exception for the initial procurement of medical marijuana,
presumes that a patient or caregiver who has direct and immediate control of a motor vehicle is transporting the medical
marijuana for nonmedical use. Notably, the presumption
would only apply to persons whose possession adheres to the
general quantity guideline limits.5
The rationale for the presumption is that there is no reason
that a patient or caregiver should be driving while transporting
marijuana, with the exception of same-day procurement, and
thus, the impermissible transporting of medical marijuana
should result in forfeiture. This, in turn, prevents the marijuana from being returned to the patient or caregiver and acts
as a deterrent to transporting marijuana for nonmedical purposes or in situations that can adversely affect public safety.
I.

COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OF MEDICAL
MARIJUANA LAWS

A. LIMITATIONS ON AMOUNTS FOR POSSESSION
AND USE
Currently, there are 13 states with laws related to medical
marijuana: Alaska, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine,
Maryland, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode
Island, Vermont, and Washington.6 The allowable limit of
marijuana that may be legally possessed spans from none in
Maryland7 to 24 ounces in Oregon,8 with Washington and New
Mexico allowing a 60-day and 90-day supply,9 respectively, as

Code Ann. § 11362.7(d), (f) (Lexis 2008).
While this article considers medical marijuana laws in general, it
surveys California law in particular.
5. As will be discussed, persons possessing quantities above the
general quantity guideline limits are likely not in compliance
with medical marijuana laws and are subject to criminal prosecution; thus, the presumption need not apply to them because
their conduct is already unlawful.
to
Reform
Marijuana
Laws,
Working
6. NORML,
http://www.norml.org/index.cfm?Group_ID=3391 (updated Dec.
01, 2004).
7. Maryland merely limits penalties to a $100 fine after a successful
defense of medical need. Md. Code Ann. Crim. Law § 5601(c)(3)(ii) (Lexis 2008).
8. Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 475.320(1)(a) (Lexis 2007).
9. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 26-2B-3(A) (Lexis 2008); Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. § 69.51A.040(3)(b) (Lexis 2008).
10. Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11362.77(a) (Lexis 2008).
4.

determined by the state health department. Most states allow
possession of between one to eight ounces of marijuana.
California permits a qualified patient or primary caregiver to
possess up to eight ounces under general quantity guidelines,10
but they may possess a greater quantity, upon physician’s recommendation, if their medical needs so require.11
B. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AND PROTECTION
GENERALLY
While states generally afford legal protections to qualified
patients and their primary caregiver, the means by which these
protections are invoked varies. Nearly every state allows the
use of its statutes to be employed as an affirmative defense
against prosecution.12 Most states have mandatory registration
and identification programs, though participation is voluntary
in California.13 Many states, including California, allow protection from arrest and prosecution for qualified patients and
primary caregivers who are registered cardholders in compliance with state law requirements.14 When the qualified patient
or primary caregiver is neither a registered cardholder nor in
full compliance, as for example when his or her possession
exceeds the general quantity limit, the qualified patient or primary caregiver may invoke the statutory protections by way of
an affirmative defense.15 This is true in California since the
qualified patient or primary caregiver need not be registered to
avail themselves of the afforded protections.16
C. EXCEPTIONS FOR ENDANGERING OTHERS
AND/OR USE WHILE IN A MOTOR VEHICLE
Though medical marijuana laws (“MMLs”) vary in the
degree of protection they afford to qualified patients and primary caregivers, most states provide exceptions to the protections granted by their MMLs. These laws prohibit qualified
patients and primary caregivers from “engaging in conduct
that endangers others”17 and/or prohibit the use of marijuana
while in an operated motor vehicle.18 California also precludes
protection for conduct that diverts marijuana for nonmedical
uses.19
D. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND REQUIRED RETURNS OF
MARIJUANA FOLLOWING SEIZURE
States also differ in their treatment of seized marijuana
and/or paraphernalia following a situation where prosecution
was not initiated or was dismissed because the possession was
deemed non-criminal. Most MMLs protect marijuana and

11. Id. § 11362.77(b).
12. Id. § 11362.5(d); People v. Mower, 28 Cal. 4th 457, 474 (2002)
(concluding that section 11362.5(d) grants a “defendant a limited immunity from prosecution . . . .”).
13. Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11362.71(a)(1) (Lexis 2007).
14. Id. § 11362.71(e).
15. Id. § 11362.77(b); People v. Wright, 40 Cal. 4th 81, 97 (2006)
(recognizing medical needs exceeding the general eight ounce
quantity limit will afford a Compassionate Use Act affirmative
defense).
16. Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11362.71(f) (Lexis 2007).
17. Id. § 11362.5(b)(2).

paraphernalia as property
[M]edical
that must be returned to a
marijuana laws
qualified patient or primary
caregiver who is in lawful
("MMLs") vary in
possession.
Some states,
the degree of
such as California, did not
protection they
enact such a provision as part
of its MMLs and look to other afford to qualified
statutes20 and decisional law
patients and
for clarification of the issue.
primary
Notably, Vermont is sui
caregivers . . . .
generis in specifying that,
under its medical marijuana
laws, law-enforcement officers are expressly not required to
return marijuana or paraphernalia following a seizure.21
II.

EFFECT OF MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAWS ON VEHICLE SEARCHES, SEIZURES, AND ARRESTS

A. MOTOR VEHICLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
Generally, “the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable
where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic
violation has occurred.”22 In addition, probable cause will permit a warrantless search of an automobile with the scope of the
search extending to “every part of the vehicle and its contents”
that might contain the items actually sought.23
B. EFFECT OF MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAWS ON
VEHICLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
California courts have explained the effect of California’s
Compassionate Use Act (“CUA”) upon law-enforcement investigations. In People v. Strasburg, a police officer encountered
Strasburg parked in his car immediately after he had smoked
marijuana.24 Strasburg notified the officer of his status as a
qualified patient and produced his prescription.25 The issue
was whether the officer had probable cause to search Strasburg’s
car and, consequentially, whether detaining and frisking him
was lawful since he was a qualified patient under the CUA.26
The court held the CUA “does not impair reasonable police
investigations and searches.”27 The court stated the CUA provides limited immunity, as opposed to a shield from investigation, and held that the officer was entitled to search and investigate to determine if Strasburg was acting lawfully because
probable cause existed after the officer smelled the marijuana.28
Strasburg’s conviction was upheld because he possessed 23

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. § 11362.79(d).
Id. § 11362.5(b)(2).
Id. § 11473.5(a).
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18 § 4474b(d) (Lexis 2007).
Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996).
People v. Strasburg, 148 Cal. App. 4th 1052, 1059 (Cal. App. 1st
Dist. 2007).
Id. at 1055.
Id. at 1055-1056.
Id at 1058.
Id.
Id. at 1060.
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ounces of marijuana.29
While voters approved the
CUA in 1996,30 the Medical
Program
Act
Marijuana
(“MMPA”) was enacted in
2003 to “address additional
issues that were not included
within the [CUA] and that
[needed to be resolved to promote its] fair and orderly
implementation . . . .”31 While
the CUA only applied to possession and cultivation,32 the
MMPA extended patient and
caregiver protections to the acts of transporting, maintaining
or allowing a place to be used for marijuana related activity,
and nuisance.33 The MMPA affords immunity from arrest and
prosecution,34 as discussed above, to a qualified patient or primary caregiver who is registered, has an identification card,
and is in compliance. The Supreme Court of California, in discussing the CUA as an affirmative defense, said that “immunity
from arrest is exceptional and, when granted . . . is granted
expressly.”35 Such is the case for a registered patient or caregiver with an identification card, but only if such persons comply with MML provisions.36

In Trippett, the
court recognized
that the
[Compassionate
Use Act] might
impliedly afford
a defense to
transporting
marijuana.

could not state a valid disability discrimination claim or
wrongful termination claim.40 The court reasoned that CUA
was not intended to alter employment relationships.41 Rather,
the CUA’s purpose is to provide seriously ill Californians with
the right to obtain and use physician-recommended marijuana
for medical purposes while ensuring that qualified users and
their primary caregivers are not subject to criminal prosecution or criminal sanction.42 The employee’s termination was
upheld since the CUA speaks exclusively to the criminal law.43
Finally, in addition to purpose and scope, the Ross court
also addressed the CUA’s limitations. In particular, the court
explicitly rejected the assertion that the CUA created a broad
right to use marijuana without hindrance or inconvenience,
since the measure did not purport to change the laws affecting
public intoxication, nor did the CUA “supersede legislation
prohibiting persons from engaging in conduct that endangers
others,” the latter being expressly codified.44

A. PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND LIMITATIONS OF
CALIFORNIA’S MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAWS
The Supreme Court of California specifically addressed the
purpose and scope of the CUA in Ross v. RagingWire Telecomm.,
Inc.37 In Ross, the plaintiff, a qualified medical marijuana user,
sued his employer after being terminated for failing a preemployment drug test.38 Ross asserted his employer needed to
afford him a reasonable accommodation and his termination
was wrongful as against public policy.39 The court held Ross

B. MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAWS AS A DEFENSE TO
CRIMINAL TRANSPORTATION
Given the manner in which the CUA and MMPA were
enacted, there has been some inconsistency with respect to
whether California’s MMLs provide a defense to a criminal
charge of transporting marijuana. The Supreme Court of
California, in People v. Wright,45 addressed the issue of transporting under California’s MMLs, noting a conflict between the
appellate court decisions in People v. Trippet46 and People v.
Young.47
In Trippet, the court recognized that the CUA might
impliedly afford a defense to transporting marijuana.48 In that
case, the defendant’s vehicle was stopped for not having a
license plate lamp light.49 Upon smelling marijuana, the police
officer searched the car and confiscated approximately two
pounds.50 Trippet was charged with both transporting and
possession.51 The Trippet court held that although the CUA
did not expressly provide a defense to transporting, it might
impliedly provide such a defense in some situations depending
upon the quantity transported and the method, timing, and
distance of the transportation to determine whether the trans-

29. Id.
30. Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11362.5(a) (Lexis 2008).
31. People v. Urziceanu, 132 Cal. App. 4th 747, 783 (Cal. App. 3rd
Dist. 2005).
32. Wright, 40 Cal. 4th at 84.
33. Id. at 93.
34. Id.
35. Mower, 28 Cal. 4th at 469.
36. Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11362.71(e) (Lexis 2007).
37. 42 Cal. 4th 920 (2008).
38. Id. at 924.
39. Id. at 925.
40. Id. at 924.
41. Id. at 928.
42. Id.
43. The California legislature has recently passed a bill to overturn
the decision handed down by the California Supreme Court in
Ross. On February 21, 2008, Assembly Member Leno introduced
Assembly Bill 2279, which has successfully passed both houses

as of August 29, 2008. The proposed law permits an employee
or prospective employee to assert a cause of action against an
employer who discriminates against him or her on the basis of
the employee’s status as a qualified patient or for taking adverse
action after the employee fails a drug test. However, the proposed law is inapplicable to those employed in a “safety-sensitive
position” and does not preclude the employer from taking
adverse action against an employee who is impaired at work or
during work hours. Legis. Counsel of Cal., Bill Information,
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/bilinfo.html; search “AB 2279”, select
“Enrolled” bill in HTML or PDF (accessed Sept. 28, 2008).
Ross, 42 Cal. 4th at 928-929.
40 Cal. 4th at 90-92.
56 Cal. App. 4th 1532 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1997).
92 Cal. App. 4th 229 (Cal. App. 3rd Dist. 2001).
Trippet, 56 Cal. App. 4th at 1536.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1547.

III. THE GARDEN GROVE DECISION WITHIN THE
FRAMEWORK OF CALIFORNIA’S MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAWS
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44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

port reasonably related to the patient’s medical needs (hereafter the “Trippet test”).52 The case was remanded to determine
whether Trippet was a qualified patient and what amount of
marijuana was authorized by her physician.53
However, the Young court expressly rejected the CUA as
affording a defense to a charge of transporting.54 In Young, an
officer observed a car swerve on the highway.55 Upon investigation, the officer asked Young if drugs were in the car.56
Young admitted the presence of marijuana, but provided a
physician’s statement authorizing use.57 The Young court held
the CUA does not provide a defense to transporting marijuana
as it unambiguously covers only possession and cultivation.58
Young’s conviction for transporting marijuana was affirmed.59
In Wright, the Supreme Court of California indirectly
endorsed the Trippet test with respect to transporting cases.
Defendant Wright was found to be in possession of several
bags of marijuana weighing just over a pound after officers
investigated a tip that his car smelled of marijuana.60 He was
charged with possession for sale, transporting, and driving on
a suspended license.61 Before trial, he pled guilty to the license
charge and, at trial, defended the remaining charges upon the
grounds that he was a qualified patient who preferred to ingest
marijuana rather than smoke it, which was why he asserted he
possessed greater than a pound.62 Wright was convicted of
possession for sale and transporting after the trial court refused
a CUA defense jury instruction.63 The issue was whether the
CUA provides a defense to a charge of transporting and
whether it was reversible error to refuse such an instruction.64
While acknowledging that the Trippet test continues to be a
useful analytical tool, the court held the transporting issue
related to the CUA was moot since the newly enacted MMPA
had extended protections to charges of transporting.65 The
court found that Wright would be entitled to a CUA defense,66
as expanded by the MMPA and under the facts of his case, but
his conviction was upheld. Since the jury was given the option
of convicting him for the lesser included offense of possession,
it had resolved, albeit implicitly but necessarily, that Wright’s
conduct was not for personal medical use when it convicted
him for sales.67
In addition to addressing whether the CUA, as expanded by
the MMPA, afforded a defense to transporting, the court
addressed what must be proven for a defendant to invoke an
affirmative defense under the CUA. In particular, the Wright
court noted that the defendant has the burden to produce evi-

Garden Grove v. Superior
Court69 addressed the right
of a qualified patient to have marijuana returned to him or her
after it was lawfully seized subsequent to a valid traffic stop. In
Garden Grove, defendant Kha was stopped for running a red
light.70 Kha consented to a vehicle search and officers recovered a pipe and 8.1 grams of marijuana that Kha claimed he
obtained from a lab in Long Beach.71 Though Kha produced a
seemingly valid doctor’s referral, the police seized the marijuana and cited Kha for running the red light and unlawful
possession of less than an ounce of marijuana while driving.72
Kha subsequently “pled guilty to the traffic violation, but . . .
contested the drug charge.”73 After Kha’s doctor verified that
Kha was authorized to use marijuana for medical reasons, the
prosecutor dismissed the criminal charge, but opposed Kha’s
request to return the marijuana.74 The trial court ordered that
the marijuana be returned to Kha.75 The City of Garden Grove
(“the City”) filed a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition
“directing the trial court to vacate its order and enter a new one
denying Kha’s motion for a return of [the marijuana].”76 The
Attorney General of California defended the trial court’s order,
as amicus curiae.77
The issue before the Garden Grove court was whether police
may deny the return of marijuana that was lawfully seized during a vehicle search because returning it would result in a violation of the federal Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”).78
The City asserted Kha was not entitled to the protections of
the CUA and MMPA because Kha 1) obtained his marijuana
illegally, 2) did not have a qualifying illness, and 3) was not
charged with a requisite offense covered under the CUA or
MMPA since he was cited for possessing marijuana while driving in violation of the Vehicle Code.79 The court rejected all

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 1550-1551.
Id. at 1536.
Young, 92 Cal. App. 4th at 231.
Id. at 232.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 237.
Id. at 238.
Wright, 40 Cal. 4th at 85-86.
Id. at 86.
Id. at 87.
Id. at 87-89.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 92.

dence that: 1) he is a qualified patient; 2) the quantity
possessed was authorized
pursuant to a physician’s
recommendation; and 3)
the marijuana is for the
defendant’s own personal
medical use.68

The issue before the
Garden Grove court
was whether policy
may deny the return
of marijuana . . .
because returning
it would result in
C. THE GARDEN
a violation of
GROVE DECISION
[federal law].
As mentioned above,

Id. at 98.
Id. at 98-99.
Id. at 100-101 (Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting).
Garden Grove, 157 Cal. App. 4th at 362.
Id. at 363.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 364.
Id.
Id. at 380.
Id. at 373.
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of these arguments stating,
respectively, 1) the CUA and
MMPA afford protection
without regard to the source
of the marijuana, 2) mere
recommendation by a physician suffices for CUA and
MMPA protection, and 3) the
Vehicle Code statute prohibiting the transporting of
marijuana was subject to a
CUA and MMPA defense
since it was merely an automobile-specific prohibition upon transporting marijuana.80
The court then addressed the issue of whether marijuana’s
illegality under federal law would permit the City to prevail on
its argument that state law, to the extent that it required the
return of the marijuana, was preempted by federal law.81 The
court acknowledged there was not any exception to criminal
possession of marijuana under federal law, but since state law
enforcement officials act pursuant to state law, they cannot use
federal laws as a mechanism of enforcement in state law proceedings.82 The court further noted that when Congress
enacted the federal CSA, it did not intend to occupy the entire
area of law that regulates marijuana or controlled substances,83
thus, the court held that federal supremacy principals of preemption did not permit the City to withhold and not return the
marijuana.84
Finally, the court addressed due process considerations
related to returning the marijuana.85 California’s statute on the
destruction of property in the absence of a conviction essentially provides that “seizures of controlled substances, instruments, or paraphernalia. . . shall be destroyed by order of the
court, unless the court finds that [they] were lawfully possessed by the defendant.”86 Despite the fact that neither the
aforementioned law nor the MML provisions expressly provide
for the return of the marijuana at issue, the court found that,
because Kha was a qualified patient with physician authorization to possess the amount seized under state law, due process
considerations of the Fourteenth Amendment required its
return.87 The court concluded by stating it was unable to discern any justification for the City or its police department to
withhold the marijuana and upheld the trial court’s order.88
Though the Garden Grove court did not explicitly apply the
three-prong test articulated in Wright, it implicitly found the
Wright test was satisfied because 1) Kha was a qualified patient
(first prong) with 2) physician authorization to possess the
amount seized (second prong), and 3) the marijuana was for
Kha’s personal medical use (third prong).89 As will be dis-
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Id. at 375-376.
Id. at 377-386.
Id. at 378-379.
Id. at 383.
Id. at 386.
Id. at 386-392.
Id. at 377-378.
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cussed, however, public policy concerns could justify permanently withholding medical marijuana subsequent to a valid
traffic stop or vehicle investigation.
IV. PUBLIC SAFETY AND PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS TO LIMIT TRANSPORTING AND THE RETURN
OF SEIZED MEDICAL MARIJUANA

Since the Garden Grove rule requires the return of lawfully
seized medical marijuana if the court finds that possession was
lawful, the prosecution must demonstrate possession was
unlawful to avoid operation of the Garden Grove rule. With the
exception of initial procurement, a patient or caregiver who
transports marijuana in a motor vehicle should be closely scrutinized because such is potentially indicative of intent to use
marijuana and then operate a motor vehicle or engage in
unlawful diversion, both of which fall outside of MML protections.
A. PUBLIC SAFETY AS A LIMITATION UPON THE
TRANSPORTING OF MEDICAL MARIJUANA
Both driving under the influence of marijuana and possessing marijuana while driving are dangers to public safety.
1. Inherent Dangers to Public Safety Resulting
from Drugged Driving

California, like many other states with MMLs, has
expressly declared that the CUA does not supersede legislation prohibiting persons from engaging in conduct that
endangers others.90 California law prohibits driving under
the influence of alcohol and drugs,91 and as a matter of law
a person’s authorized use of alcohol or a drug does not
normally constitute a defense to a violation.92 As one
court noted,
one way in which use of marijuana most clearly
does affect the general public is in regard to its
effect on driving . . . . [R]esearch has produced
increasing evidence of significant impairment of
the driving ability of persons under the influence
of cannabis. Distortion of time perception, impairment of psychomotor function, and increased
selectivity in attentiveness to surroundings apparently can combine to lower driver ability.93
These attending risks to public safety are even more
problematic in instances where a patient’s medical need
for marijuana exceeds the general eight ounce limit
because such a need for larger than usual amounts of medical marijuana necessarily means that heavier and/or more

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 387-389.
Id. at 391.
Id. at 363.
Ross, 42 Cal. 4th at 929.
Cal. Veh. Code Ann. § 23152(a) (Lexis 2008).
Id. § 23630.
Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 510 (Alaska 1975).

frequent use is required by
the patient.
This can
equate to a greater degree of
impairment, in the case of
heavier use, or a continuous state of impairment, in
the case of more frequent
use. Both of these situations lend themselves to
heightened public safety
risks when the medicated
patient undertakes to drive.
While it is certainly true
that not all qualified patients are driving under the influence, the Trippet and Strasburg cases demonstrate that
some qualified patients, if even but a minority, do in fact
smoke marijuana and then drive a motor vehicle.
Though laws prohibiting Driving Under the Influence
(“DUI”) may be sufficient if law enforcement detects
impairment, studies suggest that more than half of the
occurrences of driving under the influence of cannabis
(“DUIC”) may go undetected by the police.94 In addition,
roadside oral drug testing can be inadequate to detect current marijuana impairment and DUIC due to inaccuracies.95 Furthermore, most marijuana drug tests measure
inactive metabolites of THC, which only confirms past use
and not current impairment.96 Finally, studies have noted
a greater need for intervention by policy makers to guard
against the risks inherent to DUIC.97 Accordingly, DUI
laws do not adequately address the public safety risks
related to DUIC.

While a defendant must be a qualified patient prior to
criminal prosecution in order to invoke CUA protections,98 the general trend among the cases is that where
the qualified patient possesses less than the general eight
ounce quantity limit, the patient is not subject to criminal
prosecution. This is consistent with the CUA’s purpose of
not imposing criminal liability,99 but this alone does not

necessitate a finding that transporting is in compliance
with law so as to justify the return of lawfully seized marijuana after a valid traffic stop or police investigation
involving a motor vehicle.
As the cases demonstrate, law enforcement is often
interacting with qualified patients because of a moving
motor vehicle violation. Many of these moving motor
vehicle violations may in fact be the result of impaired driving, but - of course - this is not a given. Nonetheless,
even to the extent that the moving violation is not actually
caused by a qualified patient’s impaired driving, there
seems to be little reason that they should need to drive and
transport marijuana beyond the time it is initially procured.
The most logical and probable reason a patient would
be transporting medical marijuana with them while they
are driving is because they need or want to use it.
However, a qualified patient who drives while transporting marijuana, with the exception of its initial procurement, seems indicative of intent to operate a motor vehicle subsequent to using marijuana and, irrespective of
whether such act actually be realized, contemplates a use
of medical marijuana - conduct endangering to others that is prohibited by the MMLs and, thus, should fall outside of the CUA’s protections. Courts and the general public should be skeptical of this situation since the patient is
“not sitting at home nursing an illness with the medicinal
effects of marijuana[,]”100 but, instead, is quite feasibly a
threat to the safety of other motorists.
In Chavez v. Superior Court,101 the court disallowed the
return of marijuana in the absence of a conviction,102
which is contrary to the Garden Grove outcome. In Chavez,
the defendant was convicted of selling and transporting
marijuana.103 While awaiting the outcome of his appeal,
he was again arrested for having 4.5 pounds of marijuana
as well as possessing living and drying plants.104 His first
conviction was affirmed, and the prosecutor dismissed the
second case.105 Chavez sought a return of the marijuana.106 The issue was whether Chavez, a qualified patient
with physician-authorized use, could seek the return of the
second seizure of marijuana, or at least the general eight

94. Hassan Khiabani et al., Relationship Between THC Concentration
in Blood and Impairment in Apprehended Drivers, Traffic Injury
Prevention (June 2006), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.
nih.gov/pubmed/16854704?ordinalpos=3&itool=EntrezSystem2
.PEnt (accessed Sept. 29, 2008).
95. M. Laloup et al., Correlation of Delta9-Tetrahydrocannabinol
Concentrations Determined by LC-MS-MS in Oral Fluid and Plasma
from Impaired Drivers and Evaluation of the On-Site Dräger
DrugTest, Forensic Science International (Sept. 2006), available
at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16842950?ordinalpos=1&itool=EntrezSystem2.PEnt (accessed Sept. 29, 2008)
(advising against roadside oral drug testing for marijuana due to
66% accuracy rate).
96. J. Ramaekers et al., Dose Related Risk of Motor Vehicle Crashes
after Cannabis Use, Drug and Alcohol Dependence (Feb. 2004),
available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/14725950
?ordinalpos=1&itool=EntrezSystem2.PEnt (accessed Sept. 29,

2008).
97. F. Alvarez et al., Cannabis and Driving: Results from a General
Population Survey, Forensic Science International (Aug. 2007),
available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17628369
?ordinalpos=3&itool=EntrezSystem2.PEnt (accessed Sept. 29,
2008) (calling for greater legislative intervention due to the frequency and common occurrence of DUIC).
98. People v. Rigo, 69 Cal. App. 4th 409, 414 (Cal. App. 1st Dist.
1999).
99. Cal Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11362.5(b)(1)(B) (Lexis 2008).
100. Strasburg, 148 Cal. App. 4th at 1060.
101. 123 Cal. App. 4th 104 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2004).
102. Id. at 110-111.
103. Id. at 107.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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2. Restricting the Transporting of Medical
Marijuana to Ensure Public Safety
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ounce quantity limit the physician recommendation authorized since there was no conviction resulting from the second arrest.107 The Chavez court held that withholding and
destroying the marijuana was proper because, although the
case sub judice did not result in conviction, the amount in
possession was unlawful and the law mandated destruction
of unlawfully possessed marijuana.108 The court denied
the petition to return any of the marijuana.109
The Chavez decision demonstrates that the court will
deny the return of marijuana, even in the absence of a conviction, when the patient’s possession does not comply
with the CUA. The reasoning of the Chavez court should
be equally applicable to automobile transporting situations where a patient’s possession should be rendered
unlawful because his or her actual or intended use of the
marijuana falls outside of MML protections. In this
instance, however, the laws permitting the transportation
of marijuana, as construed by the Garden Grove court, are
allowing the unfettered transportation of marijuana by a
qualified patient merely because his or her possession is
below the general quantity guideline limit,110 the effect of
which is to tacitly endorse conduct that endangers others
and creates a risk to public safety. Like Chavez, where the
qualified patient’s intended or actual use of marijuana is
outside the realm of MML protections, his possession
should be viewed as unlawful and, subsequent to seizure,
should permit forfeiture and destruction. If possession is
found unlawful, medical marijuana may be destroyed,
even in the absence of a conviction.111
The Garden Grove court distinguished Chavez merely
by finding Kha was in lawful possession while Chavez was
not.112 When read together, these cases indicate that the
factor that is determinative of whether seized marijuana
will be returned to a qualified patient is whether the quantity possessed complies with the general quantity limit so
as to let the court find that the qualified patient was or was
not in lawful possession, which in turn does or does not
justify its return. Notably, however, Garden Grove is a
motor vehicle case while Chavez is not. A per se rule
requiring the return of medical marijuana, solely because
possession was below the general quantity limit, ignores
the importance of public policy concerns, namely maintaining roadway safety and preventing diversions.
The court’s role in construing statutes is to “ascertain the
intent of the legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the
law [and, b]ecause the statutory language is generally the
most reliable indicator of that intent, [courts] look first to

107. Id. at 108.
108. Id. at 109-111.
109. Id. at 111.
110. Garden Grove, 157 Cal. App. 4th at 375-376.
111. Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11473.5(a) (Lexis 2007);
Chavez, 123 Cal. App. 4th at 111 (concluding that “the
Compassionate Use Act does not contemplate the return of illegally possessed drugs”).
112. Garden Grove, 157 Cal. App. 4th at 387-389.

the words [of the statutes
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required return of medical
ignores the
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importance of
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public policy
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authority, on matters of
and preventing
public health or safety, to
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exert control over individuals when their activities
“begin[] to infringe on the rights and welfare of others,”
and the state need not limit the exercise of its police power
to only those activities with a “present and immediate
impact on public welfare” before it can take action.114 It
is in the exercise of those police powers that public safety
should not only justify restrictions upon the transporting
of medical marijuana but also justify its forfeiture following seizure from a motor vehicle.
B. PUBLIC POLICY AS A LIMITATION UPON THE
TRANSPORTING OF MEDICAL MARIJUANA
In addition to failing to accord adequate consideration to
public safety risks, the Garden Grove rule requiring the return
of marijuana to a qualified patient when the amount is below
the general quantity limit has significant potential to allow the
unlawful diversion of marijuana for nonmedical uses because
it fails to provide a disincentive for transportation-related CUA
abuses.
In People v. Chakos,115 a sheriff requested a marked police
car to stop the defendant’s car.116 Chakos gave consent to a
search of his car, and the police recovered seven grams of marijuana, $781 in cash, and a physician’s referral authorizing
marijuana use.117 His apartment was also searched, and police
recovered about 6 ounces of marijuana in several different containers and a digital scale.118 A closed circuit camera was also
present to allow observations of persons coming to the apartment.119 Chakos was arrested for possession for sale and convicted based upon the arresting officer’s expert opinion testimony.120 The issue on appeal was whether the officer’s testimony was legally sufficient to sustain the conviction.121 The

113. Wright, 40 Cal. 4th at 92.
114. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 509.
115. 158 Cal. App. 4th 357 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2007).
116. Id. at 360.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 360 -361.
119. Id. at 361.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 363.
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court, applying People v.
Hunt,122 held the officer
lacked qualification as an
expert witness because of
his lack of knowledge and
experience with unlawful
uses of lawfully possessed
substances.123 Since the officer lacked expert knowledge
to differentiate patterns of
lawful use and unlawful possession for sale, the conviction was reversed.
The Chakos fact pattern
demonstrates a highly suspicious situation where the defendant might have been involved in unlawful drug activity.
However, the Garden Grove rule requiring the return of lawfully seized marijuana merely because the patient or caregiver
possesses less than the general eight ounce quantity limit has
the effect of thwarting the CUA’s purposes by tacitly sanctioning the unlawful diversion of marijuana in contravention to
the CUA’s prohibitions.124
The Garden Grove rule permits a patient or caregiver to use
a motor vehicle for drug distribution activity, raise the CUA as
a defense, and, if successful, have the marijuana returned to
him or her when possession remains below the general eight
ounce quantity limit. Motor vehicles are often essential to the
illegal transportation and distribution of drugs. The Strasburg
court observed that the defendant, had his possession been
below the general eight ounce quantity limit, could have
invoked the CUA as a defense.125 Hence, the Garden Grove rule
is unsound, as a matter of public policy, for it not only fails to
provide a disincentive to refrain from diversion-related activities, but - in fact - promotes abuses of the CUA by returning
unlawfully possessed marijuana to the criminal who successfully avoids a conviction merely because possession is below
the general eight ounce quantity limit.
In sum, the public policy of preventing unlawful diversion
warrants a limitation upon the transportation of medical marijuana. Subjecting marijuana to forfeiture following lawful
seizure from a motor vehicle furthers this policy by removing
incentives to abuse the CUA.

Subjecting
marijuana to
forfeiture following
lawful seizure from
a motor vehicle
furthers this policy
by removing
incentives to abuse
the [Compassionate
Use Act].

V.

A PROPOSAL FOR A LEGAL PRESUMPTION

Public safety and policy implications should have weighed
more heavily into the Garden Grove decision. As a matter of
precedent, other courts within California, and perhaps other
states, may concur with the Garden Grove rule. In such situations, the prosecution should consider asserting that trans-

122. 4 Cal. 3d 231 (1971) (the Hunt court reversed the defendant’s
conviction of possessing methedrine for purpose of sale on the
basis that the narcotics officer’s expert opinion was insufficient to
sustain the conviction since the defendant had a legal prescription and the officer did not have sufficient expertise with lawful
use of the drug).
123. Chakos, 158 Cal. App. 4th at 363.
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porting the marijuana was unlawful because, under the circumstances, possession is indicative of a use that is an endangerment to public safety or diversion-related activities.
In the absence of the courts accepting such an argument, or
a case accepted by the Supreme Court of California on appeal,
corrective measures rest in the hands of the legislature. To this
end, legislation creating a legal presumption that presumes
medical marijuana is being transported for nonmedical use,
with an exception for the day it is initially procured, is the best
method of addressing safety and policy concerns while affording qualified patients reasonable medical freedoms the CUA
and other states’ MMLs are intended to provide.
A. A LEGAL PRESUMPTION TO EFFECTUATE PUBLIC
SAFETY AND PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS
“A presumption is an assumption of fact that the law
requires to be made from another fact or facts found or . . .
established in the action.”126 California recognizes two types
of rebuttable presumptions, those affecting the burden of producing evidence, and those affecting the burden of proof127
(i.e., persuasion).128 A presumption that affects the burden of
proof is intended to “implement some public policy, other than
to facilitate the determination of the particular action,”129 and
“impose[s] upon the party against whom it operates the burden of proof as to the nonexistence of the presumed fact.”130
1. Rationale and Considerations Respecting the
Presumption

A limitation upon the transporting of medical marijuana to implement public safety and public policy concerns should strike a balance between furthering the policy objectives while avoiding any significant erosion to the
CUA’s legal protections.
The rationale underlying the presumption is ensuring
public safety upon the roadways and preventing the diversion of medical marijuana for nonmedical purposes,
including illegal use in addition to illegal sale. These
objectives are furthered by limiting the transporting of
medical marijuana within motor vehicles, with the exception of initial procurement, to further policy objectives
because the unnecessary transporting of marijuana indicates unlawful use, namely, conduct that endangers others
through a willingness to drive after use or, alternatively,
diversion for nonmedical purposes. Permitting forfeiture,
as a civil penalty, prevents the return of medical marijuana
that is presumed to be transported for an impermissible
nonmedical purpose and imposes a consequence for nonessential transporting.

124. Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11362.5(b)(2) (Lexis 2008).
125. Strasburg, 148 Cal. App. 4th at 1060.
126. Cal. Evid. Code Ann. § 600(a) (Lexis 2008).
127. Id. § 601.
128. Id. § 115.
129. Id. § 605.
130. Id. § 606.

2. The Proposed Presumption

ii. Direct Control

This proposed presumption would implement the public policies of 1) ensuring motorist safety upon roadways
and 2) deterring the unlawful diversion of medical marijuana through transporting. The proposed presumption
would shift the burden of proof to the qualified patient or
primary caregiver who seeks to avoid the presumption’s
effect and would provide:

The “direct control”
affords a
requirement limits the presumption’s applicability reasonable means
even further by ensuring
of transporting
the limitation upon transmarijuana by a
porting marijuana is confined to a patient or care- driving patient or
giver who is or will be dricaregiver on the
ving. The patient or careday of initial
giver need not be actually
procurement.
driving but must have
direct control. As such,
the presumption would not apply to a patient or caregiver
who is merely a passenger within a vehicle because he or
she is not in direct control of the vehicle; thus, the presumption and the limitation upon transporting are inapplicable. However, if the patient or caregiver is not driving
but has direct control over the vehicle, where - for example - circumstances indicate the patient or caregiver is driving or will be driving because he or she is or will be the
vehicle’s sole occupant, the presumption and the limitation upon transporting would apply.
Essentially, the “direct and immediate control” requirement is broad enough to limit transporting in those situations where the patient or caregiver is or will be driving,
while not limiting situations where the patient or caregiver is merely transporting medical marijuana as a nondriving passenger. However, as will be discussed, merely
avoiding the application of the presumption, as a non-driving passenger, does not mean that an individual will succeed in his or her attempt to transport marijuana for nonmedical purposes.

Any qualified patient or primary caregiver who,
while having a motor vehicle under his or her direct
and immediate control, is found to possess medical
marijuana after a valid traffic stop or police investigation involving a motor vehicle, is presumed to
possess the medical marijuana for nonmedical purposes. This presumption shall not apply to any qualified patient or primary caregiver who demonstrates
that the medical marijuana in his or her possession
was obtained within the same calendar day on which
the traffic stop or police investigation involving the
motor vehicle occurred, nor shall this presumption
apply to any criminal proceeding or action, or any
civil suit where the qualified patient or primary caregiver is a defendant or real party in interest.
The presumption, by presuming possession is for a nonmedical purpose, permits law enforcement to achieve its
goal of effectuating forfeiture to deal with the unique and
problematic issues surrounding medical marijuana in the
context of motor vehicles while preserving state policy of
not subjecting qualified patients or primary caregivers to
criminal penalty. Since transporting is presumed to be for
a nonmedical purpose and outside of the CUA and MMPA
protections, forfeiture is permitted under California law.131
a. Direct and Immediate Control of a Motor Vehicle
In order for the presumption to apply, the patient or
caregiver must be in possession of medical marijuana
while having a motor vehicle under his or her direct and
immediate control. The conjunctive “direct and immediate control” element requires a sufficient nexus between
the patient or caregiver and the motor vehicle for the presumption to apply.
i.

Immediate Control

The “immediate control” requirement ensures there is
a spatial proximity between the patient or caregiver and
the motor vehicle. Mere investigation regarding medical
marijuana within a motor vehicle that the patient or caregiver owns will not trigger application of the presumption.
Rather, the immediate control requirement ensures that,
for the presumption to apply, the patient or caregiver must
be within or so close by the vehicle to render his or her
control of the vehicle immediate.

131. Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11473.5(a) (Lexis 2007).

The presumption

b. Exception for Same-Day Procurement
The presumption affords a reasonable means of transporting marijuana by a driving patient or caregiver on the
day of initial procurement. This must be so since, in the
absence of allowing at least some opportunity for transporting marijuana, a patient or caregiver would have no
means of otherwise getting it home to make use of it. The
courts have rejected the notion that patients should have
a broad right to use or transport marijuana without hindrance or inconvenience.132 By precluding the presumption’s operation upon an affirmative showing that the marijuana was procured on the day of a valid traffic stop or
police investigation involving their motor vehicle, the
patient or caregiver is afforded a window of reasonable
time to transport the marijuana home without subjecting
it to forfeiture subsequent to seizure by law enforcement.
This presumption merely curtails the unrestrained transportation of marijuana to that reasonably necessary to
ensure transportation is limited to medical uses while dissuading conduct that endangers others or is an unlawful
diversion.

132. Ross, 42 Cal. 4th at 928; Trippet, 56 Cal. App. 4th at 1547 n.8.
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c. No Criminal Liability or
Civil Liability in Suits Based
upon In Personam Jurisdiction
The final exception to the
presumption’s
applicability
ensures that it is broad enough
to permit the forfeiture of medical marijuana that is transported unnecessarily while
avoiding the imposition of
criminal or civil liability upon
the patient or caregiver.

No Criminal Liability or Sanction

Notably, the CUA, as expanded by the MMPA, precludes criminal liability for marijuana-related offenses,
including transporting marijuana, solely on the basis of
the qualified patient or primary caregiver’s status.133
The proposed presumption is intended to allow city
and county prosecutors the ability to invoke the presumption to cause a forfeiture of medical marijuana that was
being transported at sometime other than the day it was
initially procured, presumably for a nonmedical purpose.
Hypothetically, the prosecutor could, by invoking the presumption, first assert possession was unlawful and then
conceivably pursue criminal charges predicated upon the
presumed fact that possession was for an unlawful nonmedical purpose.
However, the presumption, by way of its exception, is
inapplicable to a criminal proceeding or action. Thus, the
preclusion of the presumption’s operation in any criminal
proceeding ensures that the prosecutor may not piggyback a marijuana-related conviction upon the presumption’s effect that the qualified patient or primary caregiver
is not in lawful possession. Put another way, the presumption’s exception - in accordance with the CUA’s guarantees - prevents the prosecutor from backdooring a criminal charge or conviction after invoking the presumption
of nonmedical use. In those instances where possession is
presumed unlawful because the patient or caregiver is
unable to affirmatively show same-day procurement, the
marijuana is subject to forfeiture and destruction, but the
patient or caregiver avoids any criminal liability on the
basis of transporting a quantity below the general eight
ounce limit because the presumption has no effect in any
criminal prosecution. This ensures, in accordance with
the CUA and MMPA, that the qualified patient or primary
caregiver is not subject to criminal liability or sanction on
the sole basis of their status as a patient or caregiver.

133. Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11362.765(a) (Lexis 2007).
134. People v. Super. Ct. of L.A. Co., 103 Cal. App. 4th 409, 418 (Cal.
App. 2nd Dist. 2002).
135. Such were the circumstances in Chakos, Garden Grove, Trippet,
Wright, and Young, all of which involved a driver who had direct
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ii. No Liability in Civil Suits Based upon In
Personam Jurisdiction

Finally, the presumption is inapplicable to a civil suit
where a patient or caregiver is a defendant or real party in
interest. This ensures that if a patient or caregiver is sued
in relation to a car accident, or is a real party in interest
with respect to a claim against their insurance carrier, the
presumption is inapplicable and the suing plaintiff must
bear the usual burdens of production and persuasion with
respect to causation in the civil suit. This prevents a
plaintiff from conceivably initiating a civil suit, after a
motor vehicle investigation and/or citation stemming
from an auto accident involving the patient or caregiver,
and asserting the presumption of nonmedical use as a
basis of liability with respect to causation in the auto accident. In effect, the presumption allows a forfeiture of the
marijuana without shifting usual burdens of proof in a
civil suit based upon in personam jurisdiction, which
might be initiated after an auto accident involving a qualified patient or primary caregiver where his or her fault
may be at issue.
iii. Presumption Does Apply to In Rem Proceedings

Notably, the presumption should not be inapplicable to
all civil proceedings per se and this is why only in personam civil actions are excluded. “A forfeiture proceeding
is a civil in rem action in which property is considered the
defendant, on the fiction that the property is the guilty
party.”134 Because hearings or proceedings related to the
disposition of marijuana will be required, the presumption’s applicability is preserved for those hearings or proceedings in which the court’s jurisdiction is in rem with
respect to the marijuana that is to be forfeited under the
presumption of nonmedical use.
3. Evading the Presumption’s Applicability Will
Not Result in Escaping Scrutiny

The proposed presumption creates a bright-line test for
transporting marijuana and presumes possession is for
nonmedical use under certain circumstances and therefore
unlawful. Though a person could attempt to bypass an
invocation of the presumption by transporting marijuana
as a non-driving passenger in possession, merely avoiding
application of the presumption does not necessarily mean
that an individual will always succeed in his or her
attempt to violate MMLs.
First, it is noteworthy to mention that most motor vehicle cases involving medical marijuana have been situations where the driver was the sole occupant of the vehicle.135 This may even be more likely where there is deliberate intent to circumvent drug laws under cover of medical marijuana’s statutory protections since, presumably,

and immediate control of the motor vehicle. Notably, Strasburg
is a case involving more than one occupant in the vehicle, but
Strasburg would still be covered by the proposed presumption
since he had direct and immediate control of the vehicle.

the criminal will want to go undetected. However, with
the exception of same-day procurement, lawful transport
under the proposed presumption would require the assistance of another person to drive the patient or caregiver
who would be the non-driving passenger in possession.
Second, because deliberate attempts to violate MMLs
will require the assistance of a driver to accompany the
non-driving passenger in possession, there is a greater
likelihood of detecting unlawful transporting. Specifically,
the complicity involved in the criminal enterprise, by
increasing the number of participants, gives rise to a
greater likelihood of detection.
Law enforcement encountering a driver with a non-driving passenger in possession can undertake heightened
scrutiny of their activities incidental to a vehicle stop or
motor vehicle investigation. Inquiry can be made into the
surrounding circumstances of the possession, including:
where the driver and passenger are coming from, where
they are going to, and for what purposes. Where circumstances warrant, law enforcement can undertake immediate separation of the driver and passenger for isolated
questioning to assess the truthfulness and consistencies,
or lack thereof, regarding their activities. If there appears
no discernable reason for transporting the marijuana, the
absence - for example - of a planned out of town trip or
overnight stay away from home, this will alert law enforcement of the possibility that transporting is for unlawful
nonmedical use.
Third, as a consequence and at the very minimum, law
enforcement is alerted to potential criminal activity that
can be further investigated by undercover officers.
Alternatively, though the conduct falls outside of the
scope of the presumption, where law enforcement concludes that the driver and passenger are engaged in unlawful transporting for nonmedical uses such as diversion for
sale, the non-driving passenger in possession is still subject to the usual rules of law where they can be arrested,
upon probable cause that a violation is occurring or has
occurred, and required to assert the CUA as their affirmative defense.136 Finally, for the most severe and egregious
situations where the evidence and circumstances demonstrate a strong inference of illegal activity, the police can
arrest the driver and the non-driving passenger in possession so the prosecutor may pursue conspiracy charges,
which also serves as a deterrent and punishment for individuals who would agree to be a driver in the transporting

136. While identification cardholders are immune from arrest when
possession is under the general quantity limit, a law-enforcement
officer is not required to accept the identification card as valid if
he or she “has reasonable cause to believe that the information
contained in the card is false or fraudulent, or the card is being
used fraudulently.” Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11362.78
(Lexis 2007) (emphasis added). Thus, attempting to divert marijuana may still result in arrest.
137. Notably, neither the CUA nor the MMPA afford exemption from
criminal conspiracy, thus, a qualified patient or primary caregiver
- even if registered under the MMPA identification program would not be immune from arrest on such a charge, but such
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public policy concerns.
This is accomplished by allowing the forfeiture and
destruction of marijuana that was lawfully seized from a
driver subsequent to a valid traffic stop or police investigation involving the patient or caregiver’s motor vehicle,
which - as a practical matter - is when it is most likely to
be encountered by law enforcement. A patient or caregiver could avoid operation of the presumption by not
transporting marijuana after the day it is initially procured. If transporting medical marijuana is required after
the day it is initially procured, the patient could simply get
someone to drive them. The presumption affords a limited yet reasonable allowance for transporting upon an
affirmative showing of same-day procurement.
B. THE PRESUMPTION AND FORFEITURE ARE
CONGRUENT WITH CALIFORNIA LAW
The presumption and any resulting forfeitures, which
reverse the operation of the Garden Grove rule in the motor
vehicle context, are consistent with many facets of California
law.138
1. Requiring Proof of Lawful Transport is in
Accord with Affirmative Defenses

The presumption imposes upon the qualified patient or
caregiver the burden of production and persuasion that
the marijuana was being transported in accordance with
the presumption’s exception for same-day procurement.139
This burden upon the patient or caregiver parallels the
burden of invoking the CUA as an affirmative defense to a
prosecution. Since the burden of showing lawful transport does nothing more than allocate to the qualified
patient or primary caregiver a burden similar to that
imposed if he or she were seeking protections of the CUA,

arrests would of course need to be sustainable with probable
cause.
138. Such a legal presumption could likely work in all motor vehicle
scenarios with respect to those states having MMLs or decisional
case law that mandates the return of medical marijuana.
139. Of course a person could refute the underlying fact from which
the presumed fact of “nonmedical use” ensues, but the underlying fact—a valid traffic stop or police investigation involving a
motor vehicle—is not likely to be a disputed issue in the majority of circumstances and, therefore, does not warrant discussion
more than casual mentioning.
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the burden-shifting approach is
consistent with the affirmative
defense approach taken by the
MML statutes.
In addition, the presumption
creates a bright-line test for
establishing lawful transport of
medical marijuana. The Garden
Grove court did not apply or even
acknowledge the Trippet test in
assessing the lawfulness of Kha’s
transportation of medical marijuana, despite the fact that the Supreme Court of
California indirectly endorsed it when the Wright case
went up on appeal from the same court issuing the Garden
Grove decision.140 In any event, the presumption provides
a clearly defined standard that readily allows for a determination of when marijuana should be seized and for its
subsequent disposition without adhering to a rigid rule of
required return as found in the Garden Grove decision, or
a potentially ambiguous factors test as found in the Trippet
test.
Finally, by shifting the burden of proof upon the patient
or caregiver to show that transport is lawful, the People
and the State avoid the problems embodied within the
Hunt decision. In particular, when the People carry the
burden of showing that an otherwise lawfully possessed
drug, in this case medical marijuana, is being possessed
unlawfully, as when the patient or caregiver is unlawfully
transporting marijuana for nonmedical uses, there arises a
problematic situation that the officer’s testimony may suffer from the infirmity of insufficiency if the court finds
that his or her knowledge or experience is lacking with
respect to the illegal uses of legal drugs, namely medical
marijuana.141 In this regard, by placing the burden of
proof upon the patient or caregiver, any problem regarding the expert qualifications of a testifying officer are altogether avoided.

Requiring proof
of same-day
procurement, as
a practical
matter, also
requires proof
of the source of
the marijuana.

2. Proof of Lawful Transport Deters Unlawful
Profiteering on Medical Marijuana

Only Alaska has imposed a restriction upon when medical marijuana may be transported, but Alaska’s statute,
unlike the proposed presumption, provides no means aside from the driver’s own assertions - that will allow law
enforcement a way to discern whether the transporting of
medical marijuana is “necessary” or is prohibited because
it is unnecessary. In particular, Alaska law provides:
A patient, primary caregiver, or alternate caregiver may not engage in the medical use of marijuana in plain view of, or in a place open to, the
general public; this paragraph does not prohibit a

140. Wright, 40 Cal. 4th at 92.
141. Chakos, 158 Cal. App. 4th at 359-360 (finding officer’s testimony
insufficient to sustain conviction for the sale of medical marijuana).
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patient or primary caregiver from possessing marijuana in a place open to the general public if the
possession is limited to that necessary to transport
the marijuana directly to the patient or primary
caregiver or directly to a place where the patient or
primary caregiver may lawfully possess or use the
marijuana[.]142
However, in contrast, the proposed presumption implements this “necessity of transporting” limitation for the
sake of public safety and policy, while additionally curtailing illegal diversions and drug profiteering.
In Urziceanu, the defendant admitted at trial that he
“would sometimes buy marijuana on the black market by
the pound to supply the [qualified patients].”143 The
Urziceanu case demonstrates that persons who supply
marijuana to qualified patients or primary caregivers may
be acting in an illegal manner. Worse, there may be
instances where there is no colorable compliance with
MMLs and suppliers are - in fact - drug dealers who are
unlawfully profiteering on the sale of marijuana to
patients and caregivers.
Requiring proof of same-day procurement, as a practical matter, also requires proof of the source of the marijuana. Empty assertions of same-day procurement are
unlikely to carry the patient’s burden of proof without also
demonstrating or documenting where the marijuana was
obtained. While the Garden Grove court was correct that,
under the CUA and MMPA, the source of the marijuana
need not be shown to invoke MML protections,144 requiring proof of same-day procurement: 1) encourages the
user to purchase medical marijuana from legitimate dispensaries or cooperatives; 2) favors record-keeping of
medical marijuana-related transactions; 3) requires disclosure of the source and time of procurement of the seized
medical marijuana; and 4) deters profiteering on the
unlawful drug dealing in marijuana since patients and
caregivers will have an incentive to purchase their marijuana from authorized sources to ensure its return in the
event of a seizure.
A patient seeking to prove same-day procurement has a
few options. First, the patient can obtain medical marijuana from an authorized source thereby enabling him to
prove same-day procurement if and when necessary.
Second, the patient could provide evidence of procurement from an unauthorized source, which would allow
law enforcement to discover illegal drug dealing in marijuana. Third, the patient may fail or can refuse to prove
same-day procurement of the marijuana, thereby subjecting it to forfeiture.
Furthermore, forfeiture of marijuana that is obtained
from a drug dealer is wholly consistent with the purposes
of the forfeiture statutes. “[C]ivil forfeiture is intended to

142. Alaska Stat. § 17.37.040(a)(2)(C) (Lexis 2008).
143. Urziceanu, 132 Cal. App. 4th at 764.
144. Garden Grove, 157 Cal. App. 4th at 374.

be remedial by removing the
tools and profits from those
engaged in the illicit drug
trade,”145 with law enforcement
being the principal objective.146
While a patient or caregiver may
be authorized to obtain and use
medical marijuana, marijuana
that was illegally sold by and
procured from a drug dealer
should not lose its status as an
illegal transaction merely
because the patient or caregiver
is authorized to possess it. To
the contrary, “[a]ll controlled
substances which have been manufactured, distributed,
dispensed, or acquired in violation of [the Uniform
Controlled Substances Act]” are subject to forfeiture.147
Ultimately, forfeiture aids in bifurcating lawful medical
marijuana acquisitions from unlawful drug sales thereby
curtailing the profiteering upon illegal marijuana sales
made to qualified patients and their primary caregivers.

Forfeiture results
for transporting
that risks an
endangerment to
the safety of
others and, thus,
falls outside the
[Compassionate
Use Act’s]
protections . . . .

3. Forfeiture Does Not Subject a Patient or
Caregiver to Criminal Liability

As already noted, the CUA precludes criminal liability
of a qualified patient or primary caregiver solely on the
basis of their status,148 but forfeitures are not criminal
sanctions.
In People v. Shanndoah,149 the people appealed a trial
court order dismissing criminal drug charges against the
defendant.150 The trial court dismissed the criminal
charges because the state had previously initiated forfeiture proceedings with respect to drug-related money.151
The trial court found that the forfeiture was punitive in
relation to the drug offenses; thus, double jeopardy had
attached and required dismissal of the criminal charges.152
The issue before the Shanndoah court was whether the
monetary forfeiture was a criminal sanction that required
dismissal of subsequent criminal charges that also related
to the drug offenses that gave rise to the forfeiture in the
first instance.153 The court held that forfeitures under the
Health and Safety Code are civil in nature.154 The court
reasoned that “forfeiture prescribed by the Health and
Safety Code is in rem—that is, it is an action against the
property itself [and is] distinct from a criminal proceeding
which is in personam.”155 The trial court’s dismissal of the
criminal charges was reversed.156
Because forfeitures of property under the Health and

145. Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11469(j) (Lexis 2007).
146. Id. § 11469(a).
147. Id. § 11470(a) (emphasis added); Id. § 11475.
148. Id. § 11362.765(a).
149. 49 Cal. App. 4th at 1187 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1996).
150. Id. at 1189.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1190.
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Safety Code provisions are deemed civil sanctions, forfeitures do not violate the CUA’s prohibitions on criminal liability. Accordingly, the forfeiture of medical marijuana
exacts a civil penalty that is directly proportional to the
amount of marijuana unlawfully transported.
Furthermore, even if construed as a criminal sanction,
which it is not, the CUA only prohibits liability for criminal transportation on the sole basis of a person’s status as
a qualified patient or primary caregiver.157 Forfeiture,
however, only comes into play after medical marijuana is
seized subsequent to a valid traffic stop or a police investigation involving the motor vehicle, both of which are
based upon probable cause. Thus, forfeiture is not based
solely on a patient or caregiver’s status but is the consequential result of a seizure stemming from a moving violation or a police investigation involving the patient or
caregiver’s motor vehicle.
4. Forfeiture Implements Important Policies
Without Overburdening Patients’ Rights

In the context of seizures of medical marijuana from
motor vehicles, a presumption that causes forfeiture
strikes a balance between implementing policies without
overburdening patient rights or needs.
Forfeiture, subsequent to a valid traffic stop or police
investigation involving a motor vehicle, occurs when the
patient or caregiver fails to demonstrate to the court that
transporting occurred on the day of initial procurement.
Forfeiture results for transporting that risks an endangerment to the safety of others and, thus, falls outside of the
CUA’s protections while avoiding significant inconvenience or hindrance to the qualified patient who may still
obtain and use marijuana in accordance with the CUA’s
contemplated purposes and protections. In the end,
endangering conduct and diversion are both unprotected
under the CUA and MMPA, therefore, forfeiture is justified if the patient or caregiver cannot demonstrate sameday procurement.
Alternative means, in lieu of a legal presumption that
allows for forfeiture, are inadequate for implementing policy concerns. The law could limit how marijuana is transported. For example, the transporting of medical marijuana might be confined to the trunk of the vehicle or in
a locked container, the later being the case in Vermont,158
but these restrictions are ineffective because, while they
may prevent the use of marijuana while driving, they have
no effect upon driving subsequent to use or upon preventing diversion.
Alternatively, the general quantity limits could be

153. Id.
154. Id. at 1192.
155. Id. at 1191.
156. Id. at 1193.
157. Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11362.765(a), (b)(1)-(2)
(Lexis 2007).
158. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 4474c(d) (Lexis 2007).

reduced, but this may have the effect of not allowing a sufficient quantity of marijuana to treat the illnesses of lawabiding patients who are not abusing MMLs. In addition,
a reduction to the general quantity limits unduly burdens
legitimate patients’ rights by restricting possession in situations beyond the motor vehicle context and without a
direct correlation to the public safety and policy concerns
involving motor vehicles. In this regard, the presumption
is tailored to implement policies related to specific concerns involving the transporting of medical marijuana
within motor vehicles without overburdening the rights of
patients who are otherwise in compliance with MMLs.
In sum, forfeiture allows local law enforcement and the
state the ability to ensure patients and caregivers are not
abusing MMLs through endangering conduct or diversions while the patient or caregiver’s legitimate need to
transport marijuana remains intact.
C. THE PRESUMPTION IS LIKELY TO SURVIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
To the extent that the proposed statutory presumption is
subjected to constitutional challenge, it is likely to be upheld.
The most probable constitutional challenges, if any, are likely
to be an alleged unconstitutional amendment to the CUA or a
denial of due process.
1. The Issue of Unconstitutional Amendments to
the CUA

Since the Garden Grove decision, there have been cases
addressing the issue of whether the legislatively enacted
MMPA was an unconstitutional amendment to the
CUA.159
In Co. of San Diego v. San Diego NORML,160 San Diego
and San Bernardino counties (collectively “Counties”)
contested the MMPA’s requirement that they implement
and administer the identification card system related to
qualified patients and primary caregivers.161 The issue was
whether the MMPA was preempted by the federal CSA on
the grounds of conflict preemption and obstacle preemption162 and whether the MMPA’s mandate requiring implementation of an identification card system was an unconstitutional amendment to the CUA.163 The court held the
Counties’ standing was limited to challenging only those
MMPA provisions requiring implementation of the ID card

159. See generally Co. of San Diego v. San Diego NORML, 165 Cal.
App. 4th 798 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2008); People v. Kelly, 163 Cal.
App. 4th 124 (Cal. App. 2nd Dist. 2008), superseded by grant of
review, 2008 Cal. LEXIS 9776 (Lexis 2008); People v.
Phomphakdy, 165 Cal. App. 4th 857 (Cal. App. 3rd Dist. 2008).
160. 165 Cal. App. 4th at 798.
161. Id. at 808.
162. Id. at 809.
163. Id. at 829.
164. Id. at 818.
165. Id. at 826-827.
166. Id. at 831.
167. Id. at 825.
168. Id. at 827.

program164 and that both
The most probable
conflict preemption and
constitutional
obstacle preemption were
165
unfounded.
The court challenges, if any,
also held that the MMPA
are likely to
did not amend the
be an alleged
CUA.166 The court reasoned that the CSA is
unconstitutional
silent on issuance of ID amendment to the
cards, thus, there could be
[Compassionate
no positive conflict.167
Use Act] or a
Furthermore, issuance of
ID cards was not a “signifdenial of due
icant” obstacle to CSA
process.
objectives; thus, obstacle
preemption was inapplicable.168 As to the amendment issue, the court reasoned the
MMPA did not add to the CUA as it was a separate legislative scheme, CUA protections remained intact, and the ID
card system did not impact the CUA’s protections.169 The
judgment was affirmed.170
Conversely, in People v. Kelly,171 which was decided
before San Diego NORML, the court struck down a MMPA
provision as an unconstitutional amendment.172 In Kelly,
the defendant was a qualified patient who was convicted
for the sale and cultivation of marijuana subsequent to
police seizure of 12 ounces of marijuana in addition to living plants.173 The issue was whether the MMPA’s general
eight ounce limitation upon the possession of medical
marijuana, as a legislative enactment, unconstitutionally
amended the CUA thereby rendering it prejudicial error
for the prosecutor to argue that the defendant could be
convicted for possessing more than eight ounces without
a special physician’s prescription.174 The court held that
the general quantity limits within the MMPA were an
unconstitutional amendment to the CUA; thus, the prosecutor’s argument in support of the defendant’s conviction
was improper.175 The court reasoned that the only limitation imposed upon possession of medical marijuana under
the CUA was that possession be reasonably related to the
patient’s medical needs, and because the MMPA added
general quantity limitations upon possession, it modified
the CUA and was an unconstitutional amendment.176 The
court struck down the general quantity limitations con-

169. Id. at 831.
170. Id. at 832.
171. Kelly, 163 Cal. App. 4th 124, superseded by grant of review, 2008
Cal. LEXIS 9776.
172. Another case, Phomphakdy, 165 Cal. App. 4th at 862-866, relied
upon the Kelly decision and reached the same result by essentially adopting its reasoning and same line of cases for support.
To avoid redundancy, discussion will be limited to Kelly.
173. Kelly, 163 Cal. App. 4th at 128-129, superseded by grant of review,
2008 Cal. LEXIS 9776.
174. Id. at 130.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 133-134.
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tained in the MMPA177 and
reversed the conviction.178
Currently, the Kelly case is
under review before the
California Supreme Court
with the issues limited to
whether the general quantity
limits
unconstitutionally
amend the CUA and if there were alternatives to invalidation.179 As the Kelly appellate court noted, “Legislative
acts, such as the MMP, are entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality[,]”180 but the appellate court’s
opinion is devoid of any attempt to interpret the general
quantity limits with the CUA so that the two may peaceably coexist. Since “[a]n interpretation which gives effect
is preferred to one which makes void[,]”181 the court was
obligated to attempt to reconcile the laws before severing
the purportedly offending law.
Though Kelly could be overturned on the basis of failing to adhere to the maxims of jurisprudence, the reasoning of the San Diego NORML court that the MMPA did not
amend the CUA is equally applicable to the general quantity limitations provision. The general quantity limitations
at issue in Kelly, like the ID card system at issue in San
Diego NORML, did not add to the CUA as the MMPA is a
separate legislative scheme. Further, the CUA protections
remain intact, and the general quantity limitation does not
impact the CUA’s protections, as will be explained.
The Kelly court relied on Cal. Lab. Fed’n. v. Occupational
Safety & Health Stand. Bd.182 for the proposition that the
general quantity limitations in the MMPA amounted to an
amendment of the CUA, but Cal. Lab. is distinguishable. If
the MMPA imposed an absolute cap upon quantity limits,
as did the Budget Act with respect to the attorney fees at
issue in Cal. Lab.,183 then the MMPA’s general quantity
limit would be amendatory. However, the MMPA did not
impose an absolute limit upon the amount of marijuana
that may be possessed since a patient or caregiver, with a
doctor’s recommendation, “may possess an amount of marijuana [that is] consistent with the patient’s needs.”184
Accordingly, the general quantity limits specified in the
MMPA, as distinguished from the absolute cap limit
imposed on attorney fees in Cal. Lab., are more akin to a
general guideline as to what a reasonable quantity shall be
for the treatment of illnesses. Since the general quantity
limit guideline - when read as a whole with other provisions in the MMPA - does not place any absolute limit
upon the amount of marijuana that a patient may possess
or grow, the MMPA’s general quantity limit guideline does
not impact the CUA’s protections since those protections

Currently, the Kelly
case is under
review before the
California Supreme
Court . . . .

177. Id. at 136.
178. Id. at 138.
179. Kelly, 2008 Cal. LEXIS 9776 (Lexis 2008).
180. Kelly, 163 Cal. App. 4th at 132, superseded by grant of review,
2008 Cal. LEXIS 9776.
181. Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 3541 (Lexis 2008).
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remain intact. Specifically, patients may possess and grow
an amount of marijuana that is reasonably necessary for
their condition, even when that amount exceeds the general quantity limit guideline.
While a physician’s recommendation is required for
marijuana in excess of the general quantity limit,185 a
physician’s recommendation is also needed for medical
marijuana below the general quantity limit.186 Thus, the
requirement of a physician recommendation designating a
specific amount of medical marijuana that is needed for a
patient’s condition, which exceeds the general quantity
limits, is no more onerous than the requirement that they
seek a recommendation to become a qualified patient in
the first instance. Accordingly, the MMPA’s general quantity limit neither withdraws protections nor adds obstacles
to a patient’s right to obtain sufficient quantities of marijuana for his or her illness; thus, the MMPA did not amend
the CUA.
Finally, “[i]nterpretation must be reasonable,”187 and
the law disfavors constructions that lead to absurd results.
However, severing the general quantity limit from the
MMPA severely impairs an important objective of the CUA
and MMPA by removing the only measurable standard by
which lawful conduct can be ascertained. The net effect
for non-cardholding qualified patients and primary caregivers, who are not immune from arrest, is that the judge
or jury must decide whether the amount of marijuana they
possessed was reasonable for their medical condition, after
arrest and prosecution. Because people will differ in their
own beliefs as to what is reasonable, severing the general
quantity limit brings uncertainty to the law. Thus, patients
and caregivers may be placed in the compromising position that a conviction may ultimately result if, despite their
legitimate need, the amount of marijuana they possess is
found to be unreasonable. Additionally, the effect upon
cardholding patients is that they, in the absence of evidence
of criminal conduct, may possess excessively large quantities of marijuana while enjoying immunity from arrest and
prosecution. When factoring in the current lack of restrictions upon transporting and the Garden Grove rule of
required return, we are left with a potentially disastrous set
of laws that seem to favor illegal drug trafficking. Severing
the general quantity limit from the MMPA leads to unreasonable and absurd results.
2. The Presumption Within the Framework of an
Amendment to the CUA

The proposed presumption’s limitation upon transporting is incapable of amending the CUA. Since the MMPA
was a legislative enactment that extended protection from

182. 5 Cal. App. 4th 985 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1992).
183. Id. at 991-992.
184. Cal. Health & Safety. Code Ann. § 11362.77(b) (Lexis 2008).
185. Id.
186. Id. § 11362.5(b)(1)(A).
187. Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 3542 (Lexis 2007).

criminal prosecution to the crime of transporting,188
which was a punishable offense under the CUA standing
in isolation,189 any limitation upon the unfettered right to
transport medical marijuana is merely a limitation upon a
legislatively granted immunity and cannot be an abrogation of a right granted by voter initiative under the CUA.
Indeed, under the CUA, no such right existed. As such,
the proposed presumption’s limitation upon transporting
cannot be an amendment to the CUA because the CUA
afforded no right of qualified immunity from prosecution
for transporting.
3. The Presumption Affords Due Process of Law

The Garden Grove court, relying on People v. Lamonte,190
found that the police could not retain Kha’s medical marijuana without running afoul of the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.191 The presumption, however, satisfies the due process standards articulated in
Lamonte.
In Lamonte, the defendant was arrested after trying to
use fabricated credit cards in a restaurant.192 The police
recovered many items from the defendant’s car including
numerous credit cards, false identification cards, laminating equipment, various telephone and computer equipment, and a shotgun.193 Lamonte negotiated a guilty plea
to the charges of felon in possession of a firearm and burglary and then sought return of all property, except the
weapons.194 The motion was opposed by the state.195 The
issue was whether the state could withhold property on
the basis that the property items were instrumentalities of
crime.196 The court held that the defendant’s property was
not contraband and must be returned to him.197 The court
reasoned that only contraband was excepted from return
and merely using a lawful item in the commission of a
crime does not make it contraband.198 The court directed
the property to be returned.
“Contraband is goods or merchandise whose importation, exportation, or possession is forbidden.”199 Since the
presumption presumes that possession of marijuana
within a vehicle is for nonmedical use and unlawful, the
reasoning of the Lamonte court would permit forfeiture
subsequent to a lawful seizure. The marijuana that is presumed for nonmedical use is unlawful contraband and, as
the Lamonte court noted that contraband does not need to
be returned,200 the marijuana seized - applying Lamonte would not need to be returned.
Second, as the Lamonte court appropriately noted, “[t]he
confiscation and destruction of property without a hearing,

188. Wright, 40 Cal. 4th at 92.
189. Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11362.5(d) (Lexis 2008);
Young, 92 Cal. App. 4th at 237.
190. 53 Cal. App. 4th 544 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1997).
191. Garden Grove, 157 Cal. App. 4th at 386-387.
192. Lamonte, 53 Cal. App. 4th at 546.
193. Id. at 546-547.
194. Id. at 547.
195. Id.

proceeding or other forum to determine whether the property was dangerous, illegal to possess or otherwise excepted
from return to the owner is an unconstitutional deprivation
of property without due process of law.”201 However, the
presumption affords the patient or caregiver an opportunity,
through judicial process, to assert that the presumption is
inapplicable because the marijuana was procured on the
same day in which the traffic stop or motor vehicle investigation occurred. Thus, because the patient or caregiver
would be afforded a hearing to determine the legal or illegal
character of the seized marijuana, the operation of the presumption satisfies due process of law.
Ultimately, the presumption’s operation, with respect to
qualified patients and primary caregivers who transport
marijuana in motor vehicles, is likely to be upheld as constitutional because it does not amend the CUA, nor does
it offend due process of law.
CONCLUSION

Medical marijuana laws are intended to afford suffering or
ill patients a means of relief that conventional prescription
medications are unable to provide. However, there are welldocumented abuses of medical marijuana laws by persons who
would attempt to subvert their intended purposes while invoking the protections the statutes afford. In this regard, the nonessential transporting of marijuana by a qualified patient or
primary caregiver who is driving should be viewed as conduct
that indicates an intent to use or possess marijuana in a way
that is not contemplated under MMLs - namely engaging in
conduct that endangers others and/or unlawful diversions for
nonmedical use - and, thus, should be viewed as outside MML
protections. In those states adhering to a rule requiring the
return of lawfully seized medical marijuana, a legal presumption that effectuates a forfeiture of marijuana that is legally
seized subsequent to a valid traffic stop or motor vehicle investigation may be a viable means of implementing public safety
and public policy concerns related to highway safety and drug
enforcement efforts.
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Resource Page
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ONLINE

CENTER FOR SENTENCING
INITIATIVES, NATIONAL CENTER
FOR STATE COURTS
http://www.ncsconline.org/csi/index.
html
The National Center for State Courts
has a new section on its website devoted
to discussion and research about sentencing issues. The website explores the
expanded use of evidence-based sentencing practices, as well as risk- and
need-assessment information that may
help in identifying sentencing options
that can best protect the public, reduce
recidivism, and hold offenders accountable. The website was set up with assistance from the Public Safety
Performance Project of the Pew
Charitable Trusts’ Center on the States
and the State Justice Institute.
The Conference of Chief Justices and
Conference
of
State
Court
Administrators adopted a resolution in
2007 endorsing the increased use of evidence-based sentencing practices. The
resolution concluded that “the use of
validated ‘offender risk and need assessment tools’ is critical in reducing recidivism” and urged states “to adopt sentencing and correction policies and programs based on the best research evidence of practices shown to be effective
Judges and
in reducing recidivism.”
policy makers can turn to this new website to stay up-to-date on research in this
area.
There are already several useful
reports and resources on the website.
We note a few of them here.
BRIAN J. OSTRUM, CHARLES W. OSTROM,
ROGER A. HANSON & MATTHEW KLEIMAN,
ASSESSING CONSISTENCY AND FAIRNESS IN
SENTENCING: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN
THREE STATES (2008).
These researchers at the National Center
for State Courts studied sentencing patterns in three states that use substantially different systems of sentencing
128 Court Review - Volume 44

guidelines: Minnesota, which has a relatively strict system; Michigan, which
allows more judicial discretion; and
Virginia, where compliance with the recommended sentences is voluntary. The
study reported these key findings:
• Guidelines do make sentences more
predictable. Predictability was highest
in Minnesota and lowest in Virginia.
• Guidelines effectively limit disparities
in sentencing based on characteristics
such as race and economic impact.
The study found that the influence of
those factors was negligible in all
three of these states, even Virginia
with its voluntary guidelines: “A voluntary guideline system with substantial sentencing ranges does not necessarily lead to increases in discrimination, as many observers might have
expected.”
• Guidelines make sentencing patterns
more transparent.
• State officials have many options
available to them when designing sentencing guidelines.
• Active participation by a sentencing
commission is an essential part of an
effective guideline-sentencing system.
NEAL B. KAUDER & BRIAN J. OSTROM,
STATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES: PROFILES
AND CONTINUUM (2008).
This report reviews sentencing-guidelines systems in 21 states, placing them
on a continuum from the most voluntary to the most mandatory. Judges and
policy makers may find this review of
interest in identifying states that have
similar systems: judges might find relevant caselaw in a state with similar provisions, while policy makers may be
interested in states both similar and
divergent.
ROGER K. WARREN, EVIDENCE-BASED
PRACTICE TO REDUCE RECIDIVISM:
IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE JUDICIARIES
(2007).
Roger Warren, a former California judge
and past National Center for State
Courts president, makes the case for
applying evidence-based sentencing
practices to reduce recidivism. Warren

reviews research about what works in
reducing recidivism; he crystallizes the
research into a set of evidenced-based
practices. A detailed review of drug
courts, which have implemented many
evidence-based practices in sentencing,
is included. Warren emphasizes ways in
which judges can enhance reduced
recidivism.
In addition to evidencebased practices, he reviews proceduralfairness concepts that can lead to greater
acceptance of court outcomes and to
defendants taking responsibility for
their own conduct.

CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD
1943–2007
Los Angeles Times Obituary:
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/sep/23/
local/me-whitebread23
Law
professor
Charles
H.
Whitebread, who reviewed the decisions
of the United States Supreme Court at
the American Judges Association’s
annual education conference for more
than 25 years, died September 16, 2007.
He was 65.
He taught at the University of
Southern California law school from
1981 to 2008; before that, he taught at
the University of Virginia law school
from 1968 to 1981.
Whitebread’s presentations at AJA
conferences were the highlight of each
year’s annual meeting. Whitebread also
wrote a summary of the past year’s cases
each year for Court Review, and he
served on Court Review’s editorial board
from 1998 until his death. Some
remembrances of him are found at page
4 of this issue. For those who would
like to read an obituary, a good one ran
in the September 23, 2008, Los Angeles
Times (Valerie J. Nelson, Supreme Court
Expert Taught at USC, available on
Westlaw at 2008 WLNR 18054334).
In its obituary, the Times reported
that Whitebread’s popularity was
reflected in a Facebook group called,
“Charlie Whitebread Rocks My World.”
The group had more than 1,600 members.

